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Summary In social decision-making, people care both about others’ outcomes and their intentions to help or harm. How the brain integrates representations of others’ intentions with their outcomes, however, is unknown. In this study, participants inferred others’ decisions in an economic game during functional magnetic resonance imaging. When the game was described in terms of donations, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) activation increased for inferring generous play and decreased for inferring selfish play. When the game was described in terms of individual savings, however, VMPFC activation did not distinguish between strategies. Distinct medial prefrontal regions also encoded consistency with situational norms. A separate network, including right temporoparietal junction and parahippocampal gyrus, was more activated for inferential errors in the donation than in the savings condition. These results for the first time demonstrate that neural responses to others’ generosity or selfishness depend not only on their actions but also on their perceived intentions.

How do audiences react to leaders who change their opinion after taking moral stances? We propose that people believe moral stances are stronger commitments, compared with pragmatic stances; we therefore explore whether and when audiences believe those commitments can be broken. We find that audiences believe moral commitments should not be broken, and thus that they deride as hypocritical leaders who claim a moral commitment and later change their views. Moreover, they view them as less effective and less worthy of support. Although participants found a moral mind changer especially hypocritical when they disagreed with the new view, the effect persisted even among participants who fully endorsed the new view. We draw these conclusions from analyses and meta-analyses of 15 studies (total N = 5,552), using recent statistical advances to verify the robustness of our findings. In several of our studies, we also test for various possible moderators of these effects; overall we find only 1 promising finding: some evidence that 2 specific justifications for moral mind changes-citing a personally transformative experience, or blaming external circumstances rather than acknowledging opinion change-help moral leaders appear more courageous, but no less hypocritical. Together, our findings demonstrate a lay belief that moral views should be stable over time; they also suggest a downside for leaders in using moral framings. (PsycINFO Database Record

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Certain objects such as family heirlooms are often treated as if they have intrinsic moral qualities, including sacredness and infinite value. Other objects such as instruments of torture are often seen as inherently repellent. Do people also evaluate more mundane objects such as refrigerators as morally good or bad? Here we explore the nature and scope of moral object evaluation through two experiments that asked participants to rate how morally good or bad a large set of familiar objects were. We find that (a) everyday objects tend to be seen as morally positive and (b) unlike mere liking, the moral evaluation of objects is positively linked to the age and political conservatism of the participants. These findings are discussed in relation to research on automatic evaluation, mere exposure effects, and the relationship between affective states and moral judgments.