Playing the trust game with other people’s money

Kvaløy, Ola; Luzuriaga, Miguel

doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9386-4

Cited by 20 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…5. This flat payment to the sender/intermediary also aligns with the approch used by Kvaløy and Luzuriaga (2014) and Maximiano et al (2013).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 53%

“…In many situations where decision-making is delegated (including the examples noted earlier), trust is as important as it is in bilateral interactions. Recently, Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2013) and Kvaløy and Luzuriaga (2014) have investigated the impact of delegated decision-making on trust and reciprocity. Kvaløy and Luzuriaga used a trust game set-up; while Maximiano et al used a gift-exchange game to study worker effort (reciprocity) under different management scenarios.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Group Identity in Intermediated Interactions: Lessons from a Trust Game with Delegation in South Africa

Hamann¹,

Nicholls²

2018

Research in Experimental Economics

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We investigate the role of group identity in delegated decision-making. Our framework considers the impact of group identity (based on racial segregation in post-Apartheid South Africa) on decisions to appoint a representative in a trust game with delegated decision-making, where information on the race group of other players is either common or private knowledge. We test our framework experimentally on a sample of young South Africans who had never been exposed to experimental economics research. By exogenously matching parties according to their race group, we observe their endogenous trust and delegation behavior. Our results suggest that white players try to use information about group identity to increase profits, albeit unsuccessfully. This may help to explain distrust and coordination failures observed in reallife interactions.

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“…5. This flat payment to the sender/intermediary also aligns with the approch used by Kvaløy and Luzuriaga (2014) and Maximiano et al (2013).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 53%

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Group Identity in Intermediated Interactions: Lessons from a Trust Game with Delegation in South Africa

Hamann¹,

Nicholls²

2018

Research in Experimental Economics

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“…Using the same investment task, Pollmann, Potters, and Trautmann (2014) found that risk-taking increased whereas Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) found that risk-taking decreased when making decisions for others. Using a similar task, Kvaløy, Eriksen, and Luzuriaga (2014) identified that risk-averse participants took more risks on behalf of another person, whereas risk-seeking participants took fewer risks. These inconsistencies do not seem to be attributable to the type of task used.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies which found that risk aversion decreases in surrogate decisions, in the psychology literature, used hypothetical decisions for a friend ( Beisswanger et al, 2003 ; Stone & Allgaier, 2008 ; Stone et al, 2013 ; Wray & Stone, 2005 ) or for a stranger ( Ziegler & Tunney, 2015 ), and in the economic literature used real decisions for a stranger ( Chakravarty et al, 2011 ; Kvaløy et al, 2014 ; Mengarelli et al, 2014 ; Polman, 2012 ; Pollmann et al., 2014 ). Studies which found that risk aversion increases in surrogate decisions used real decisions for a stranger ( Kvaløy et al, 2014 ), for the participant and a stranger ( Pahlke, Strasser, & Vieider, 2015 ), or for a group ( Reynolds et al, 2011 ). Studies which found an absence of difference used hypothetical decisions for a friend ( Benjamin & Robbins, 2007 ; Stone et al, 2002 ) or real decisions for a stranger ( Stone et al, 2002 ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Risk Preferences in Surrogate Decision Making

Batteux

Ferguson

Tunney

2017

Experimental Psychology

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Abstract. There is growing evidence that decisions made on behalf of other people differ from the decisions we make for ourselves because we are less affected by the subjective experience of their outcome. As a result, the decisions we make for other people can be more optimal. This experiment investigated surrogate decision making using a probability discounting task where participants made choices between risky and sure options. Psychological distance between the decision maker and the recipient was manipulated by having participants make decisions for themselves, their friend, and another unknown participant. Risk preferences were closer to neutrality (i.e., more consistent with expected value) when making decisions on behalf of another participant than when making decisions for themselves or a friend. We conclude that subjective risk preferences are attenuated in surrogate decision making. Findings are discussed in relation to inconsistencies in the literature and theories of surrogate decision making.

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“…Bigoni et al 2013;Bauernschuster, Falck, and Große 2013) attempt to split the trustworthiness or trusting decision among two players, but retain a fixed multiplier value and sequential play between the three players. Recent research has investigated the implications of playing the trust game, either on behalf of others ("clients"; Kvaløy and Luzuriaga 2014) or with other people's money (Jones 2013). When studied in the context of a multi-level trust game, such 'brokering' could enable an understanding of the decisions individuals made when not handling their own resources.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Trust Broker Game: A Three-Player Trust Game with Probabilistic Returns and Information Asymmetry

Tagat

Kapoor²

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The trust broker game: a three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry Terms of use: Documents in Anirudh Tagat and Hansika KapoorAbstract This paper experimentally investigates trust and trustworthiness in a repeated and sequential three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry. It adds to the existing literature by combining experimental features from recent work in the trust game. The authors use random variations in the multiplier value, a third player without an initial endowment, undisclosed termination rules, and variations in information availability related to transactions. The framework is novel in that the game continues even if the first player transfers no amount to the second player. Using participants from India, the results are broadly consistent with past evidence on the trust game. All players are more trusting when information of their transfers and earnings are made available to other players. The third player (termed the "trust broker") transfers a larger amount when information on transfers is disclosed to other players. The authors find that information availability leads to a significant increase in the trust broker's reciprocity, as defined by the amount that is returned to Player 2. Social desirability, cultural contexts, and learning effects are discussed in terms of scope for future research. JEL C91 C92 D64 D70

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Playing the trust game with other people’s money

Cited by 20 publications

References 36 publications

Group Identity in Intermediated Interactions: Lessons from a Trust Game with Delegation in South Africa

Group Identity in Intermediated Interactions: Lessons from a Trust Game with Delegation in South Africa

Risk Preferences in Surrogate Decision Making

The Trust Broker Game: A Three-Player Trust Game with Probabilistic Returns and Information Asymmetry

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