Vaccination is vital to protect the public against COVID-19. The aim of this systematic review is to identify and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions to increase COVID-19 vaccine uptake. We searched a range of databases (Embase, Medline, Psychology & Behavioral Science, PsycInfo, Web of Science and NIH Preprints Portfolio) from March 2020 to July 2021 for studies which reported primary quantitative or qualitative research on interventions to increase COVID-19 vaccine uptake. Outcome measures included vaccination uptake and reported intention to vaccinate. Reviews, position papers, conference abstracts, protocol papers and papers not in English were excluded. The NHLBI quality assessment was used to assess risk of bias. In total, 39 studies across 33 papers met the inclusion criteria. A total of 28 were assessed as good quality. They included interventions relating to communication content, communication delivery, communication presentation, policy or vaccination delivery, with 7 measuring vaccination uptake and 32 measuring vaccination intention. A narrative synthesis was conducted, which highlighted that there is reasonable evidence from studies investigating real behaviour suggesting that personalising communications and sending booking reminders via text message increases vaccine uptake. Findings on vaccination intention are mixed but suggest that communicating uncertainty about the vaccine does not decrease intention, whereas making vaccination mandatory could have a negative impact. Although much of the research used experimental designs, very few measured real behavioural outcomes. Understanding which interventions are most effective amongst vaccine-hesitant populations and in the context of booster vaccinations will be important as vaccine roll outs continue across the world.

Background Are we more risk-averse or risk-seeking when we make decisions on behalf of other people as opposed to ourselves? So far, findings have not been able to provide a clear and consistent answer. Method We propose a meta-analysis to assess whether self-other differences vary according to particular features of the decision. We reviewed 78 effect sizes from 49 studies (7,576 participants). Results There was no overall self-other difference, but there were moderating effects of domain and frame . Decisions in the interpersonal domain were more risk-averse for self than for other. Decisions in the medical domain were more risk-seeking for self than for other. There were no overall self-other differences in the financial domain, however there was a moderating effect of frame : decisions in a gain frame were more risk-averse for self than other whereas decisions in a loss frame were more risk-seeking for self than other. This effect of frame was slightly different overall and in the medical domain, where self-other differences occurred in a loss frame but not in a gain frame. Conclusion Future work should continue to investigate how the specific content and context of the decision impacts self-other differences in order to understand the effects of domain and frame we report.

Abstract. There is growing evidence that decisions made on behalf of other people differ from the decisions we make for ourselves because we are less affected by the subjective experience of their outcome. As a result, the decisions we make for other people can be more optimal. This experiment investigated surrogate decision making using a probability discounting task where participants made choices between risky and sure options. Psychological distance between the decision maker and the recipient was manipulated by having participants make decisions for themselves, their friend, and another unknown participant. Risk preferences were closer to neutrality (i.e., more consistent with expected value) when making decisions on behalf of another participant than when making decisions for themselves or a friend. We conclude that subjective risk preferences are attenuated in surrogate decision making. Findings are discussed in relation to inconsistencies in the literature and theories of surrogate decision making.

Uncertainties pervade our health choices, particularly in the context of a novel pandemic. Despite this, rather little is known about when and how to effectively communicate these uncertainties. The focus in the medical literature so far has been on how patients respond to mentions of uncertainty relating to diagnosis or treatment, showing that these can have detrimental effects on trust and satisfaction. On the other hand, how patients are affected by these communications over time, particularly in the face of conflicting information, has received little attention. This is particularly important in the context a novel pandemic where uncertainty is rife and information changes over time. To fill this gap, we conducted an online study with UK participants on hypothetical communications relating to COVID-19 vaccines. Participants first read a vaccine announcement, which either communicated with certainty or uncertainty, and then received information which conflicted with the announcement. Those who were exposed to the certain announcement reported a greater loss of trust and vaccination intention than those who were exposed to the uncertain announcement. This shows that communicating with unwarranted certainty can backfire in the long-term, whereas communicating uncertainties can protect people from the negative impact of exposure to conflicting information.

The ways in which the decisions we make for others differ from the ones we make for ourselves has received much attention in the literature, although less is known about their relationship to our predictions of the recipient's preferences. The latter question is of particular importance given real-world occurrences of surrogate decision-making which require surrogates to consider the recipient's preferences. We conducted three experiments which explore this relationship in the medical and financial domains. Although there were mean discrepancies between surrogate predictions and choices, we identified a predictive relationship between the two. Moreover, when participants took high risks for themselves, it seems that they were not willing to do so for others, even when they believed that the recipient's preferences were similar to their own. We discuss these findings relative to current theories and real-world instances of surrogate decision-making.

Cultural background might influence knowledge and attitudes regarding autism, influencing willingness to interact. We studied whether beliefs, knowledge, contact, and attitude differed between the UK and Malaysia. With mediation analyses, we studied how these factors influenced willingness to interact. Autism was more often linked to food in the UK, and to upbringing in Malaysia. Knowledge, contact, and acceptance were greater in the UK. When excluding psychology students, Malaysian students were less willing to interact with autistic people. Knowledge and contact appeared to improve acceptance, but acceptance did not mediate the relation between country, beliefs, knowledge, and experience; and willingness to interact. Knowledge and contact regarding autism might improve acceptance in different cultures, but how acceptance could improve interaction is unclear.

Background: A large number of end-of-life decisions are made by a next-of-kin for a patient who has lost their decision-making capacity. This has given rise to investigations into how surrogates make these decisions. The experimental perspective has focused on examining how the decisions we make for others differ from our own, whereas the qualitative perspective has explored surrogate insights into making these decisions. Methods: We conducted a mixed methods study to bring these two perspectives together. This is crucial to comparing decision outcomes to the decision process. We asked older adult partners to make end-of-life decisions for each other. They then took part in a semi-structured interview about their decision process. Transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis. Results: 24 participants took part in the study. Surrogates were more likely to take a life-saving treatment at the risk of a diminished quality of life for their partner than for themselves. This was consistent with their transcripts which showed that they wanted to give their partner a better chance of living. Although there was evidence of surrogate inaccuracy in the decision task, participants overwhelmingly reported their intention to make a decision which aligns with the substituted judgment standard. However, uncertainty about their wishes pushed them to consider other factors. Conclusions: Taking a mixed methods approach allowed us to make novel comparisons between decision outcome and process. We found that the intentions of surrogates broadly align with the expectations of the substituted judgment standard and that previous discussions with their partner helps them to make a decision.

A considerable proportion of end-of-life decisions are made by the patient’s next-of-kin, who can be asked to follow the substituted judgment standard and decide based on the patient’s wishes. The question of whether these surrogate decision makers are actually able to do so has become an important issue. In this study, we examined how the likelihood of surrogates conforming to the substituted judgment standard varies with individual differences in mortality acceptance and confidence in their decision making. We recruited 153 participants in romantic relationships between 18 and 80 years old from the general population. We asked them to make hypothetical end-of-life decisions for themselves and on behalf of their partner, as well as predict what their partner would do, and complete a series of questionnaires. Participants predicted that their partner would make similar decisions to their own but were more likely to accept a life-saving treatment that could result in reduced quality of life on their partner’s behalf than for themselves. Decisions made by older adults were more likely to conform to the substituted judgment standard, which is encouraging given that they are more likely to be confronted with these decisions in real life, although this was not due to differences in mortality acceptance. Older adults were also more likely to have had previous discussions with their partner and thereby know that person’s wishes and feel confident that they made the right decision, but these factors did not affect their likelihood of conforming to the substituted judgment standard. This shows that encouraging discussions about end of life among families would ease the decision process, but more work is needed to ensure that surrogates can adhere to the substituted judgment standard.