2016
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1229359
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Playing the blame game on Brussels: the domestic political effects of EU interventions against democratic backsliding

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Cited by 95 publications
(74 citation statements)
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“…In this respect, extreme parties from the left and the right use quite different argumentseither economic insecurity or national sovereignty related arguments -to influence their voters (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). Domestic oppositional parties have adopted a populist rhetoric, blaming the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for domestic economic difficulties resulting from the global financial crisis, suggesting that international organizations constrain domestic sovereignty (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017;Schlipphak and Treib, 2017;Tarlea, 2018Tarlea, , 2019Vasilopoulou et al, 2014). In an effort to win back voter support for parties adopting a Eurosceptic rhetoric, governments may be influenced by this type of rhetoric in forming preferences on EMU reform.…”
Section: Alternative Explanations: Public Opinion Institutions and mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this respect, extreme parties from the left and the right use quite different argumentseither economic insecurity or national sovereignty related arguments -to influence their voters (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). Domestic oppositional parties have adopted a populist rhetoric, blaming the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for domestic economic difficulties resulting from the global financial crisis, suggesting that international organizations constrain domestic sovereignty (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017;Schlipphak and Treib, 2017;Tarlea, 2018Tarlea, , 2019Vasilopoulou et al, 2014). In an effort to win back voter support for parties adopting a Eurosceptic rhetoric, governments may be influenced by this type of rhetoric in forming preferences on EMU reform.…”
Section: Alternative Explanations: Public Opinion Institutions and mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It would be erroneous to suggest that the reforms of the past two decades constituted an attempt to impose upon Central Europe a set of solutions, which were somehow "alien" to the region, and not reflective of what at least some of the political class and the broader public desired. Rather than impugning the EU for the illiberal turn (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017), or for its inability to thwart it (Jenne & Mudde, 2012;Rupnik, 2016), we should consider the possibility that the accession process empowered political elites and civil society in V4 to take ownership of the European integration process. Some have embraced it; others seek more distance.…”
Section: Illiberal Swerving and The Eumentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This finding is pertinent even beyond the Semester as is goes to show that mechanisms of persuasion and social pressure can make governments and stakeholders amenable to requestswhich can uplift EU legitimacy (cf. Schlipphak & Treib, 2017). Second, ESOs' role makes the case for the institutionalization of network governance between domestic actors and Commission officials.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%