Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of theParmenides

Abstract

In this paper, Plato’s notion of the sudden moment is fully explored. In the Parmenides, the “now” (nun) and the “sudden” (exaiphnês), it is argued, refer to one and the same entity from the distinct perspectives of timeless Being and temporal Becoming, respectively. This interpretation tallies well with, and enriches, the Platonic views on time and eternity found in the Timaeus. Finally, the paper highlights the pivotal role of the third deduction, where the sudden moment appears, for an understanding of the entire dialectical exercise of the Parmenides.

This Strange Creature: Plato and Conversion Experiences

“…Perhaps we all partake of certain smoldering truths, which, like a spark, might ignite suddenly and illuminate a different way. 30 More recent scholarship on the pivotal role of ἐξαίϕνης in Plato's works include (McGinley 2009;Gordon 2010;Rangos 2014;Cimakasky 2017). Some scholars, e.g., (McNeill 1999;Backman 2007), examine Plato's use of ἐξαίϕνης as a prelude for interpretations of similar concepts such as Martin Heidegger's "moment of vision".…”

Design of the Exercise in Plato’sParmenides

“…The Appendix assumes that the one is in time (as in Deduction 2) because it sets out to show that the opposite conclusions of Deductions 1 and 2 can be true at different times. For an interpretation of this deduction different from mine, see in this volume the paper by Spyros Rangos ( 2014 ). Note that he calls it the "third" deduction, whereas I call the next deduction the "third."…”

τὸ ἐξαίφνης and Time in Plato's Parmenides

“…For a process to be a genuine process, it must always already be on its way beyond τὸ νῦν towards the future; but it is claimed that what is in τὸ νῦν stops “coming-to-be” and can only “be,” and since what is in a process cannot sidestep τὸ νῦν, this means that what is in τὸ νῦν can never go beyond it, and thus a thing can never be in a process. This implies that “the now excludes becoming and by so doing it excludes any possibility of change” (Rangos, 2014, p. 546), a thing can only be what it is in the now and can never change into something other than what it is.…”

“…Section 3.1 examines how Ron Polansky and Joe Cimakasky (2013) and Søren Kierkegaard (1980) identify τὸ ἐξαίφνης with eternity. Section 3.2 analyzes the subtle and complex account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης provided by Spyridon Rangos (2014). I argue that even though Rangos does not wholly identify τὸ ἐξαίφνης with τὸ νῦν of the second deduction, he nonetheless assimilates it into the conception of time implied in τὸ νῦν and identifies it with eternity.…”