PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0

Kaliski, Burt

doi:10.17487/rfc2898

Cited by 269 publications

(198 citation statements)

References 10 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…The private key K priv user , corresponding to K pub user is secured using AES in counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode (see [16]) with a decryption key derived (see [11]) from the decryption PIN, known only to the user.…”

Section: Signature Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Qualified Mobile Server Signature

Orthacker

Centner

Kittl³

2010

Security and Privacy – Silver Linings in the Cloud

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International audienceA legal basis for the use of electronic signatures exists since the introduction of qualified electronic signatures in EU Directive 1999/ 93/EC. Although considered as key enablers for e-Government and e-Commerce, qualified electronic signatures are still not widely used. Introducing amobile component addresses most of the shortcomings of existing qualified signature approaches but poses certain difficulties in the security reasoning. The proposed server based mobile signature approach authenticates the signatory over trusted channels and assists the protection of the signature-creation data with organizational measures. As with traditional qualified signature approaches, strong authentication of the signatory to the system is ensured by two factors. Knowledge of a PIN and possession of a valid subscriber identity module card is verified over two separate communication channels. The qualified mobil server signature fulfills the requirements on secure signature-creation devices defined by the EU directive and in particular its Austrian implementatio

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Section: Signature Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Qualified Mobile Server Signature

Orthacker

Centner

Kittl³

2010

Security and Privacy – Silver Linings in the Cloud

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“…While many servers adopt the current state-of-the-art approach for storing passwords in a hashed form, e.g. using PBKDF2 [14,23] or bcrypt [20], with a random salt to protect against server compromise or re-use attacks, there have been many known cases, e.g. [21,17,22,10], where passwords have been stored in clear and compromised subsequently.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Checks and Verifier-Based PAKE

Kiefer

Manulis

2014

Computer Security - ESORICS 2014

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Abstract. Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Checks (ZKPPC), introduced in this work, enable blind registration of client passwords at remote servers, i.e., client passwords are never transmitted to the servers. This eliminates the need for trusting servers to securely process and store client passwords. A ZKPPC protocol, executed as part of the registration procedure, allows clients to further prove compliance of chosen passwords with respect to password policies defined by the servers. The main benefit of ZKPPC-based password registration is that it guarantees that registered passwords never appear in clear on the server side. At the end of the registration phase the server only receives and stores some verification information that can later be used for authentication in a suitable Verifier-based Password Authenticated Key Exchange (VPAKE) protocol. We give general and concrete constructions of ZKPPC protocols and suitable VPAKE protocols for ASCII-based passwords and policies that are commonly used on the web. To this end we introduce a reversible mapping of ASCII characters to integers that can be used to preserve the structure of the password string and a new randomised password hashing scheme for ASCII-based passwords.

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“…Indeed, more than ninety percent of the 6.5 million password hashes pilfered from LinkedIn were cracked within six days [32]. Dedicated password hashes such as bcrypt [43] or PBKDF2 [37] only give a linear security improvement: n times more effort to verify passwords for an honest server makes offline dictionary attacks at most n times harder. his password attempt.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memento: How to Reconstruct Your Secrets from a Single Password in a Hostile Environment

Camenisch

Lehmann

Lysyanskaya

et al. 2014

Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014

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Passwords are inherently vulnerable to dictionary attacks, but are quite secure if guessing attempts can be slowed down, for example by an online server. If this server gets compromised, however, the attacker can again perform an offline attack. The obvious remedy is to distribute the password verification process over multiple servers, so that the password remains secure as long as no more than a threshold of the servers are compromised. By letting these servers additionally host shares of a strong secret that the user can recover upon entering the correct password, the user can perform further cryptographic tasks using this strong secret as a key, e.g., encrypting data in the cloud. Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing (TPASS) protocols provide exactly this functionality, but the two only known schemes by Bagherzandi et al. (CCS 2011) and Camenisch et al. (CCS 2012) leak the password if a user mistakenly executes the protocol with malicious servers. Authenticating to the wrong servers is a common scenario when users are tricked in phishing attacks. We propose the first t-out-of-n TPASS protocol for any n > t that does not suffer from this shortcoming. We prove our protocol secure in the UC framework, which for the particular case of password-based protocols offers important advantages over property-based definitions, e.g., by correctly modeling typos in password attempts.

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PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0

Cited by 269 publications

References 10 publications

Qualified Mobile Server Signature

Qualified Mobile Server Signature

Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Checks and Verifier-Based PAKE

Memento: How to Reconstruct Your Secrets from a Single Password in a Hostile Environment

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