Pitfalls and Dilemmas in Labour Market Policies for Disadvantaged Groups - and How To Avoid Them

Abstract

This article summarizes the findings of an explorative research project commissioned by the European Commission's Third Poverty Programme, on inefficiencies and undesired side-effects of targeted labour market policies.These 'pitfalls and dilemmas' are discussed in relation to three types of socioeconomic effects that are expected from these polices: 1 distributional effects: a number of explicit or implicit mechanisms of discrimination against vulnerable groups in existing policies are described: legal or administrative barriers to entry, creaming off mechanisms, inconsistencies between measures.Even positive discrimination in favour of the most vulnerable groups appears to have its drawbacks. The article concludes that the abolition of existing discriminations, and the establishment of guaranteed services to all unemployed people are to be preferred over positive discrimination.2 labour market outcomes for beneficiaries: low or even negative performance of policies are manifested in failures to meet the needs of unemployed people or of the labour market, segmentation of provision, or other kinds of 'shortcomings' including stigmatization. Remedies are sought in a better design of policies for particularly disadvantaged groups, a rigorous application of the 'routine' principle, and partnerships between public agencies, social partners and local non-profit organizations.3 macro-economic effects: it is argued that 'active labour market policies' are on the whole more effective at redistributing opportunities than at creating employment. In a situation of excess labour supply, one can hardly expected supplyside measures to restore the equilibrium. Therefore, activating labour supply should to in tandem with more structural policies. R6sum6 PIÈGES ET DILEMMES DANS LES S POLITIQUES DU MARCHÉ DU TRAVAIL V I S -I -V I DES GROUPES S DÉFAVORISÉS -ET COMMENT LES S EV ITER Cet article risume les risultats d'un projet de recherche exploratoire réaltsé dans le cadre du trolslème programme pauvreti de la Communauti sure les effets non déslrés et entrainant une mefficaelté des polrtlques ciblies du marche du travail.Ces 'peges et dilemmes' sont dlscutés en fonction de trois types d'effets soao-economrques qui sont attendus de telles polrtlques.

Who Wants Demanding Active Labour Market Policies? Public Attitudes towards Policies that put Pressure on the Unemployed

“…This dichotomy originates from the ideological roots of the first ALMP schemes implemented in the 1950s in Sweden (enabling) in contrast with those initiated in the 1980s in liberal countries (demanding). While, in social-democratic countries, training-based ALMPs prevent the marginalisation of individuals with low or obsolete skills and optimise the match between labour demand and supply (Nicaise et al, 1995;Lødemel and Trickey, 2001;Bonoli, 2013), in the US and UK, demanding ALMPs try to accelerate the labour market reintegration of the unemployed, who are held individually responsible for lacking work (King, 1995;Daguerre, 2007;Bonoli, 2010: 439). Currently, virtually all countries incorporate some demanding elements.…”

“…In turn, these frames affect voters' preferences and, by consequence, as suggested by Brooks and Manza (2006), government policy-making (Larsen, 2007). I analyze this relationship by looking at Switzerland and Denmark, which share a tradition of human capital-based ALMPs whose aim is primarily to decrease the structural skills mismatch and avoid marginalisation of the unemployed (Nicaise et al, 1995;Bonoli, 2013) and at the UK whose model was instead heavily influenced by the US workfare approach that attributes individual responsibility to the jobless (King, 1995;Lødemel and Trickey, 2001;Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Finally, I include France, Italy and Germany that are situated between these extremes and focus on social integration through occupational measures (cf.…”

The Comparative Effectiveness of Different Delivery Frameworks for Training of the Unemployed

“…Shackleton (1995) cites studies of the UK Youth Training scheme with displacement rates up to 80%. Similar competition between youth training candidates and older unemployed people has been observed in the Netherlands (Nicaise et al, 1995). A question arises which is topical in the UK in relation to the New Deal; what forms of funding framework and work experience arrangements can help to maximise 'additionality' and minimise displacement?…”

Compensation or competition: Bias in immigrants' access to active labour market measures

“…Assigning individuals to underperforming measures may be further incentivised as participants do not count as unemployed in official statistics (SECO, ). Hence, competition logic results in a prioritisation of easy‐to‐place jobseekers who are closer to the requirements of the labour market (Fraser, ; Nicaise et al, ).…”