Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing

Wirl, Franz

doi:10.1006/jeem.1994.1001

Cited by 86 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…Secondly, i t i s s h o wn that land exploitation occurs more slowly under the non-cooperative framework. Similar qualitative results are also found in Wirl (1994) and Tahvonen (1996), who consider the e ects of a tax levied on energy consumption in, respectively, a Cournot and a Stackelberg dynamic game between energy producers and a government.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 78%

Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

Piga

2003

Environmental and Resource Economics

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The paper studies the characteristics and the e ects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists' accommodations. First, a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered. In each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development, whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit. Linear Perfect Markov strategies are derived for both the non-cooperative and the public monopoly case. In equilibrium, a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly. Furthermore, the more the monopolist discounts the future, the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced. Second, the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure. The tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use. However, its combined e ect with another policy instrument s u c h as a quota, induces the optimal level of resource use.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 78%

Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

Piga

2003

Environmental and Resource Economics

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“…Unsurprisingly, oligopolistic interaction has not been considered as a fundamental ingredient in modelling this issue. In fact, the backbone of the dynamic analysis carried out on this leitmotiv (Markusen, 1975;Sinclair, 1992Sinclair, , 1994Ulph and Ulph, 1994;Wirl, 1994;1995;Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996;Tahvonen, 1996;Rubio and Escriche, 2001) focusses on monopolistic extraction, where this single agent is a cartel (say, OPEC).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Solving this game under imperfect information (i.e., assuming simultaneous moves), Wirl (1994Wirl ( , 1995 shows that the outcome of linear feedback strategies Pareto-dominates that generated by non-linear strategies. Tahvonen (1996) extends the analysis to the case of Stackelberg play, with the exporting cartel taking the leader's role, and shows that the optimal Pigouvian tax rate is higher that the rate emerging at the Stackelberg equilibrium, proving that the cartel may in fact design its price policy so as to soften the tax pressure and the resulting revenues accruing to the importing country.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Lambertini

2014

SSRN Journal

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This paper o¤ers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a di¤erential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of …rms in the commons is also addressed.

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“…24 If the resource-owning country can exercise market power, by contrast, they may attempt to raise the initial resource price, because this would reduce the environmental tax and allow the resource-owner to capture some of the tax revenues that the resource-consuming countries would otherwise collect [cf. Wirl (1994)]. The resource-consuming countries then fail to completely extract rents.…”

Section: Environmental Taxes Are Resource Taxesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The double-dividend hypothesis of environmental taxes: a survey

Schöb¹

2005

The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2005/2006

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Terms of use: Documents in The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey SummaryThis survey reviews the recent literature on the double-dividend hypothesis of environmental taxes and discusses some extensions of the standard model such as the distributional consequences and the importance of the non-separability assumption between consumption goods and environmental quality for the optimal design of environmental policies. Turning to a model with imperfect labour markets we then show under which circumstances environmental taxes on polluting inputs in production and on polluting consumption goods can reap a second dividend in the form of an employment dividend and discuss the welfare implications. Finally, we turn to international aspects of environmental taxation. When environmental problems are tied to the use of exhaustible resources, resource-consuming countries can appropriate resource rents at the cost of resource-owning countries by levying environmental taxes strategically.

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Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing

Cited by 86 publications

References 0 publications

Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

The double-dividend hypothesis of environmental taxes: a survey

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