Picosecond imaging circuit analysis

Tsang, J. C.; Kash, J. A.; Vallett, D.P.

doi:10.1147/rd.444.0583

Cited by 67 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Integrated PICA systems are based on gated multi-channel plates with NIR-sensitive cathode materials. They were developed explicitly for failure analysis of semiconductors [98,172]. PICA delivers both spatial and very high temporal resolution, but offers only very limited NIR-sensitivity [98,172].…”

Section: Detection Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They were developed explicitly for failure analysis of semiconductors [98,172]. PICA delivers both spatial and very high temporal resolution, but offers only very limited NIR-sensitivity [98,172]. However, integrated PICA systems have a starting price of around 1,000,000 e. Since it is unlikely that these systems will ever become a commodity, this price will most probably not decrease within the next years.…”

Section: Detection Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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Section: Detection Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Detection Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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“…PEM is reliable and the results are easy to interpret, but it is ineffective in diagnosing timing-related defects. Timing problems can be analyzed by a picosecond integrated circuit analyzer (PICA) [3,4]. The device is capable of acquiring timing information about internal nodes with a resolution of around 10 ps.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optical Failure Analysis Technique in Deep Submicron CMOS Integrated Circuits

Kim¹,

Lee²,

Lee³

et al. 2011

JSTS:Journal of Semiconductor Technology and Science

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Abstract-In this paper, we have proposed a new approach for optical failure analysis which employs a CMOS photon-emitting circuitry, consisting of a flipflop based on a sense amplifier and a photon-emitting device. This method can be used even with deepsubmicron processes where conventional optical failure analyses are difficult to use due to the low sensitivity in the near infrared (NIR) region of the spectrum. The effectiveness of our approach has been proved by the failure analysis of a prototype designed and fabricated in 0.18 μm CMOS process.Index Terms-Circuit testing, deep submicron CMOS technology, failure analysis, photon emission, picosecond imaging circuit analysis (PICA)

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“…More precisely, the PICA sensor delivers the time and position of each photon emitted by the targeted circuit zone [16]. This technique has been initially developed to identify any functionality problem using temporal information during backside inspections [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Failure Analysis Meets Side-Channel Attacks

Di-Battista

Courrège

Rouzeyre

et al. 2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. The purpose of failure analysis is to locate the source of a defect in order to characterize it, using different techniques (laser stimulation, light emission, electromagnetic emission...). Moreover, the aim of vulnerability analysis, and particularly side-channel analysis, is to observe and collect various leakages information of an integrated circuit (power consumption, electromagnetic emission ...) in order to extract sensitive data. Although these two activities appear to be distincted, they have in common the observation and extraction of information about a circuit behavior. The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why these activities should be combined. Firstly it is shown that the leakage due to the light emitted during normal operation of a CMOS circuit can be used to set up an attack based on the DPA/DEMA technique. Then a second method based on laser stimulation is presented, improving the "traditional" attacks by injecting a photocurrent, which results in a punctual increase of the power consumption of a circuit. These techniques are demonstrated on an FPGA device.

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Picosecond imaging circuit analysis

Cited by 67 publications

References 26 publications

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Optical Failure Analysis Technique in Deep Submicron CMOS Integrated Circuits

When Failure Analysis Meets Side-Channel Attacks

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