When Failure Analysis Meets Side-Channel Attacks

Di-Battista, Jerome; Courrège, Jean-Christophe; Rouzeyre, Bruno; Torres, Lionel; Perdu, Philippe

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_13

Cited by 26 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…To show that photonic side channel attacks are a real threat to cryptographic devices, other researchers suggested further research in this direction as well: "An interesting point for future research will be to re-do these experiments on [...] low-cost systems to validate the real benefit of them" [59]. We accomplished this task and showed that successful photonic side channel attacks do not require an awfully expensive measurement system.…”

Section: Symmetric Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…In 2011, an integrated PICA system and laser stimulation techniques were used to attack a DES implementation on an FPGA [59]. The authors show that the optical side channel can be used for differential analysis.…”

Section: Photonic Emission For Attacking Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Again, no attacks using temporal information were demonstrated, but emission images for ⊕ operations were successfully analyzed. In 2011, a fragment of the DES algorithm on an FPGA was attacked with a differential photonic emission analysis [59]. The authors partially recovered the secret key using temporally resolved measurements.…”

Section: Definition 41 (Simple Photonic Emission Analysis) a Simplementioning

confidence: 99%

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Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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Section: Symmetric Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Photonic Emission For Attacking Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definition 41 (Simple Photonic Emission Analysis) a Simplementioning

confidence: 99%

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Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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“…3.2.1 Electromagnetic Attacks These attacks deal with discerning the encoded plaintext of a power line message through the leakage of electromagnetic radiation [63,64]. These attacks use special probes placed at various locations along the unit or circuit in question.…”

Section: Decryption Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These faults can be anything from unusual environmental conditions (increased heat, for example), the injection of a laser beam at the appropriate frequency [64], or the injection of data packets that collide with legitimate packets [71]. The work of Yuan and Liu [72][73][74] has shown the load redistribution attack.…”

Section: Fault Analysis Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

López¹,

Sargolzaei²,

Santana³

et al. 2015

JEPE

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Abstract:The smart grid is the next generation of power and distribution systems. The integration of advanced network, communications, and computing techniques allows for the enhancement of efficiency and reliability. The smart grid interconnects the flow of information via the power line, intelligent metering, renewable and distributed energy systems, and a monitoring and controlling infrastructure. For all the advantages that these components come with, they remain at risk to a spectrum of physical and digital attacks. This paper will focus on digital vulnerabilities within the smart grid and how they may be exploited to form full fledged attacks on the system. A number of countermeasures and solutions from the literature will also be reported, to give an overview of the options for dealing with such problems. This paper serves as a triggering point for future research into smart grid cyber security.

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