"Picking Winners": Federal Discretion and Local Experience as Bases for Planning Grant Allocation

Gilbert, Neil; Specht, Harry

doi:10.2307/974352

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…President Obama's embrace of competitive approaches with RTTT raises an obvious question: What are the advantages to using competitions rather than formulas to distribute grants? The literature on intergovernmental grants suggests three potential benefits of competitive approaches (Derthick 1970;Gilbert and Specht 1974;Beam and Conlan 2002;Collins and Gerber 2008). First, competitions help to enhance accountability and minimize agency problems by forcing potential recipients to develop specific plans for their use of funds.…”

Section: Competitive Grants and Educational Federalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama's Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice

Manna

Ryan

2011

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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We use the Obama administration's Race to the Top (RTTT) program to address two questions about competitive grants. First, what does RTTT and its competitive approach reveal about the current state of educational federalism? Second, and more generally, how do large federal grant programs operate when state governments compete for funds? Our analysis indicates that although RTTT has expanded federal involvement in state education policy, its success still depends crucially on subnational implementation. We also note the important role of state capacity in predicting states'abilities to apply to and perform well in the RTTT competition.We conclude by suggesting implications for educational federalism during the coming years and offering more general insights about the operation of competitive federal grants to states. Scholars frequently use federal grant programs to consider theoretical or empirical questions about American Federalism. One consistent pattern in the nation's intergovernmental system has been for federal lawmakers to use formulas to distribute large grants to subnational governments. Certainly, hundreds of competitive federal grants, often called ''project'' grants, also exist in which awards are not guaranteed because applicants compete for funds. Still, the vast majority of federal dollars flow to states via large formula grants, such as those for Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, and highway planning and construction (Beam and Conlan 2002). Politically, these formula grants provide legislators with reliable funding streams that help them claim credit with their constituents. That is one reason why proposals to change grant formulas, which can alter the amounts that states or congressional districts receive, spark intense political debates on Capitol Hill. In education, federal officials have relied heavily on formula grants in major laws such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), presently known as the No Child Left behind Act (NCLB).

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Section: Competitive Grants and Educational Federalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama's Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice

Manna

Ryan

2011

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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“…Just as importantly, previous studies of comprehensive district spending were unable to report any meaningful association between federal receipts and the socioeconomic characteristics of congressional districts, although some environmental influences on some district allocations (Anagnoson 1980) have been shown. Important influences over local distributions of federal funds come from outside Congress as well, including municipal characteristics (Stein 1981), local ideology and activism (Satzstein 1977), and bureaucratic discretion (Gilbert and Specht 1974;Arnold 1981). These, however, are studies of intergovernmental transfers, while congressional districts do not, as such, participate in federal funding.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Federal Spending in Congressional Districts

Owens

Wade

1984

Western Political Quarterly

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HIS ARTICLE examines the distribution of total and pro-T grammatic spending among congressional districts and advances JL two major hypotheses based upon recent trends in congressional behavior and policy-making to explain some significant part of those allocations. Its thesis suggests that altered patterns of influence in what has been described as the &dquo;New Congress&dquo; have produced sometimes contradictory tendencies to allocate spending both universally and redistributively among congressional districts. Perceptible linkages have thus been forged between congressional processes and comprehensive district allocations. The empirical conclusions are both theoretically reinforcing and novel, since past scholarship has failed to establish meaningful connections between comprehensive (and often programmatic) district spending and either the internal organization of congressional power or the socioeconomic characteristics of congressional districts.Below, a brief overview of prior studies in this field is offered, followed by a presentation of the propositions explored in the subsequent empirical analysis of district spending.

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“…It has surfaced once again in the funding of infrastructure in light of the 2007 I-35 W bridge collapse in Minneapolis [25,26]. The political pork barrel theory was challenged by Anagnoson [20,21] and Gilbert and Specht [27], who argued that such allocations would result in increases in the Congressional budget rather than effectively distributing funds to target needs [22].…”

Section: Other Federal Grant Programsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allocating U.S. Department of Homeland Security funds to States with explicit equity, population and energy facility security criteria

Greenberg

Irving

Zimmerman

2009

Socio-Economic Planning Sciences

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"Picking Winners": Federal Discretion and Local Experience as Bases for Planning Grant Allocation

Cited by 10 publications

References 2 publications

Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama's Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice

Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama's Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice

Federal Spending in Congressional Districts

Allocating U.S. Department of Homeland Security funds to States with explicit equity, population and energy facility security criteria

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