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2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2017.11.032
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Picking on the family: Disrupting android malware triage by forcing misclassification

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Cited by 49 publications
(43 citation statements)
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“…Given that manipulating the content of Android malware can be relatively easy, especially due to the possibility of injecting dead code, this behavior highlights the potential vulnerability of such classifiers. In fact, if the decisions of a classifier rely on few features, it is intuitive that detection can be easily evaded by manipulating only few of them, as also confirmed in previous work [6], [8]. Conversely, if a model distributes relevance more evenly among features, evasion may be more difficult (i.e., require manipulating a higher number of features, which may not be always feasible).…”
Section: B Global Explanationsmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…Given that manipulating the content of Android malware can be relatively easy, especially due to the possibility of injecting dead code, this behavior highlights the potential vulnerability of such classifiers. In fact, if the decisions of a classifier rely on few features, it is intuitive that detection can be easily evaded by manipulating only few of them, as also confirmed in previous work [6], [8]. Conversely, if a model distributes relevance more evenly among features, evasion may be more difficult (i.e., require manipulating a higher number of features, which may not be always feasible).…”
Section: B Global Explanationsmentioning
confidence: 62%
“…The work of Biggio and others [ 58 ] has shown several examples on how these techniques can be easily defeated. Besides, in the malware detection field, tools such as EvadeML [ 59 ], IagoDroid [ 5 ], or EEE [ 9 ] have proved that those features representing the malware can help to learn how to create undetectable variants.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, different works have strong caveats on static analysis, providing malicious concealment via metamorphism or polymorphism, and dynamic analysis via red pills. Besides, modern methods can even attack the triage process, shaping the malicious piece to look as benign as possible using machine learning [ 5 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…SigMal [27] shares some similarities with Bitshred, but uses signal processing based analysis to improve resistance to noise. More recently, Calleja et al [18] showed that confusing statistical classification systems may be easy for malware writers. More generally, the recent research trend on adversarial machine learning [24] cast a shadow on the robustness of triage solutions based on statistical models.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%