Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience

What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience

“… As Polger (, 84) notes, the issues here are similar to those that figure in certain discussions of metaphysical grounding (Bennett , Dasgupta , deRosset ). My discussion is geared towards Polger's use of this regress‐theoretic concern as a response to Horgan's rejection of brute supervenience, and I do not claim that the considerations that I offer directly bear on the notion of grounding, the question of what grounds grounding, and so on. …”

“…On the other hand, I believe that some recent critical discussions of Horgan's position on these issues miss the mark, but do so instructively. My focus will be the discussions due to Tom Polger () and Jessica Wilson (). Polger and Wilson agree with Horgan's general view that sufficient conditions for physicalism cannot be given in terms of supervenience .…”

Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems

“… See Howell (2009) and Polger (2013).30 Two points are worth noting. First, it should be emphasized that the concerns here arise specifically for the truthmaking-based approach to physicalism, and (perhaps unlike the concerns raised in Sect.…”