Physical Security for the μABYSS System

Weingart, Steve H.

doi:10.1109/sp.1987.10019

Cited by 26 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…A good example here is IBM's Citadel prototype [Pa92]; another is the new ISA-bus version of Fortezza. These devices provide the best security and computational ability of which we are aware; in the case of the IBM Citadel, the circuitry is wrapped with nichrome wire whose penetration triggers zeroization, and a 386, a megabyte RAM, and high-speed DES engine all reside within the secure envelope [Wein87,Yee94] Although the term "smart card" is often used for nearly every item in this list, we conform to the general standard of using it only for IC chip cards. (To underscore the difference, some wags have suggested the term "smart-ass card" for the more powerful secure coprocessors.…”

Section: Smart Disksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure coprocessing applications and research issues

Smith¹

1996

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The potential of secure coprocessing to address many emerging security challenges and to enable new applications has been a long-standing interest of many members of the Computer Research and Applications Group, including this author. The purpose of this paper is to summarize this thinking, by presenting a taxonomy of some potential applications and by summarizing what we regard as some particularly interesting research questions.

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Section: Smart Disksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure coprocessing applications and research issues

Smith¹

1996

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“…We cannot secure an entire workstation-even if we could, we could not secure the user! Secure coprocessors are being rapidly deployed; there are now several commercial secure coprocessor procucts available from IBM ( ABYSS [Wein87], Citadel [WWAP91]) and other vendors. Transforming this small amount of physical security into a larger secure protocol raises some subtle issues.…”

Section: Secure Coprocessorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security and Privacy for Partial Order Time

Smith¹,

Tygar²

1994

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Partial order time expresses issues central to many problems in asynchronous distributed systems, but suffers from inherent security and privacy risks. Secure partial order clocks provide a general method to develop application protocols that transparently protect against these risks. Our previous Signed Vector Timestamp protocol provides a partial order time service with some security: no one can forge dependence on an honest process. However, that protocol still permits some forgery of dependence, permits all denial of precedence, and leaks private information. This paper uses secure coprocessors to improve the vector protocol: our new Sealed Vector Timestamp protocol detects both the presence and absence of causal paths even in the presense of malicious processes, and protects against some privacy risks as well. By solving these previously open security problems, our new protocol provides a foundation for incorporating security and privacy into distributed application protocols based on partial order time.

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“…It is possible to build physical security systems to protect sensitive data [12,5,6,15] These systems can make unauthorized access to the data difficult, as a bank vault makes stealing cash a daunting task (tamper resistant). They can trigger mechanisms to thwart the attack, much like an alarm system (tamper responding).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Security Devices for Computer Subsystems: A Survey of Attacks and Defenses

Weingart

2000

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Self Cite

133

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Abstract.As the value of data on computing systems increases and operating systems become more secure, physical attacks on computing systems to steal or modify assets become more likely. This technology requires constant review and improvement, just as other competitive technologies need review to stay at the leading edge. This paper describes known physical attacks, ranging from simple attacks that require little skill or resource, to complex attacks that require trained, technical people and considerable resources. Physical security methods to deter or prevent these attacks are presented. The intent is to match protection methods with the attack methods in terms of complexity and cost. In this way cost effective protection can be produced across a wide range of systems and needs. Specific technical mechanisms now in use are shown, as well as mechanisms proposed for future use. Common design problems and solutions are discussed with consideration for manufacturing.

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Physical Security for the μABYSS System

Cited by 26 publications

References 2 publications

Secure coprocessing applications and research issues

Secure coprocessing applications and research issues

Security and Privacy for Partial Order Time

Physical Security Devices for Computer Subsystems: A Survey of Attacks and Defenses

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