Physical Security Devices for Computer Subsystems: A Survey of Attacks and Defenses

Abstract

Abstract.As the value of data on computing systems increases and operating systems become more secure, physical attacks on computing systems to steal or modify assets become more likely. This technology requires constant review and improvement, just as other competitive technologies need review to stay at the leading edge. This paper describes known physical attacks, ranging from simple attacks that require little skill or resource, to complex attacks that require trained, technical people and considerable resources. Physical security methods to deter or prevent these attacks are presented. The intent is to match protection methods with the attack methods in terms of complexity and cost. In this way cost effective protection can be produced across a wide range of systems and needs. Specific technical mechanisms now in use are shown, as well as mechanisms proposed for future use. Common design problems and solutions are discussed with consideration for manufacturing.

Classification of Attacks on Embedded Systems

“…In addition, the security measures should be taken upon detection of a problem (Grand, 2004). In the same context, (Weingart, 2000) describes the various mechanisms ranging from the easiest and cheapest to the most difficult and extremely expensive. To conclude, the definition of new methodologies for safety assessment, which takes into account the changing of security nature, could ensure security of our products.…”

Trust and Security in RFID-Based Product Authentication Systems

“…Even though tag authentication protocols can provide significant improvements to a tag's cloning resistance, there are many ways to conduct a cloning attack even against a protected tag. These attacks include side channel attack that is based on information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem (e.g., [3]), reverse-engineering and cryptanalysis that includes brute force attack but also much more sophisticated techniques (e.g., [4], [6]), and physical attacks where the goal is to read the secret key directly from tag's memory (e.g., [5]). In addition, tag authentication approach is always vulnerable to data theft where the secret encryption schemes of genuine tags are obtained from insiders through means of manipulation and fraud (social engineering) or even through threatening and blackmailing (rubber-hose cryptanalysis).…”

Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions

“…A gets back the internal data stored on the secure coprocessor. This query can be seen as an attack wherein A gets physical access to a secure coprocessor and bypasses the tamper detection mechanism [29]. This query is only available to the adversary when considering the strong-corruption model (see Section 5).…”

“…-Corrupt s (U ): This query models the attacks in which the adversary gets access to the smart card and gets back the player's LL-key. This query models attacks like differential power analysis or other attacks by which the adversary bypasses the tamper detection mechanisms of the smart card [29].…”