Philosophical Renegades

Frances, Bryan

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0007

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…It is a familiar epistemic principle that views requiring a massive error theory, that is, views that imply that most people have false beliefs with respect to a given proposition, are to be regarded skeptically (Jackson, 1998;Wright, 1994). To be fair, this epistemic principle has its detractors (Frances, 2013), but generally, philosophers hold that extraordinary evidence is needed to overturn widespread, commonsense views. Given that, determining what people believe is essential to determining whether the presumption against error theories weighs for or against Fuller's theory.…”

Section: Overview Of the Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law Revisited

Donelson¹,

Hannikainen²

2018

Preprint

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Section: Overview Of the Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law Revisited

Donelson¹,

Hannikainen²

2018

Preprint

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“…One such problem is pervasive disagreement. Recently, Bryan Frances (2010Frances ( , 2013 and Sanford Goldberg (2013Goldberg ( , 2015 have argued that philosophical disagreement is particularly inimical to knowledge and justified belief. Goldberg's argument focuses on "systematic" disagreement: philosophical disagreement is not localized to an individual proposition, is widespread in the field, and is entrenched (Goldberg, 2015, p. 229).…”

Section: Skeptical Worriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Montminy and Skolits (2014) argue for a position like this in defending knowledge contextualism from a selfundermining objection.31 E.g.,Goldberg (2015), DeRose (2016),Frances (2013), andHájek (2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Endorsement and assertion

Fleisher

2019

Nous

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Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. Hence, I call the theory the EQUD model. Motivating this account is a recognition that the speech act of assertion has two roles to play in research contexts. The first is the advocacy role, in which researchers assert a theory in order to advocate for it. The second is the evidential role, which is used to add to the common stock of information available to a field of inquiry. The EQUD model provides an account of warranted assertion for both these roles in research contexts. This success provides support for the theory of endorsement. It also provides support for information updating accounts of assertion.

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“…Several authors have put forth skeptical arguments about philosophy that turn on the notion of disagreement (e.g., Feldman 2006, Frances 2010, Frances 2013, Fumerton 2010, Goldberg 2009, Kornblith 2010, Kornblith 2013.…”

Section: The Informal Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy

Frances¹

2015

Episteme

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Abstract:A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.The new kind of skepticism described below makes me think that many of my most interesting beliefs are false and should be given up. Unlike traditional skepticism it's a kind of skepticism that is worrisome, as it points to falsehood (and not merely lack of knowledge) and says that we have to change our intellectual lives. And it starts with the most innocent and wise observations: for just about any philosophical view you once endorsed, if you are an experienced philosopher then you are fully aware that back when you endorsed it there were serious objections to it that you couldn't knock down.My goal in this essay is merely to set out the problem: since the problem is new, it would be over the top to think I have a solution to it. In the next section I start with an informal presentation of the argument, since it's novel and opinions may differ on how best to make it precise. Then I present one way to make the argument precise. Then I defend the premises. After that I consider the untoward epistemic consequences of philosophers who truly escape the argument's skeptical snare. I end the paper with remarks on applying the skeptical argument to areas other than philosophy.

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Philosophical Renegades

Cited by 16 publications

References 5 publications

Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law Revisited

Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law Revisited

Endorsement and assertion

Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy

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