Perspectival Variance and Worldly Fragmentation

Lipman, Martin A.

doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1020503

Cited by 19 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Fragmentalism was introduced by Kit Fine [17], who claimed that it sheds new light on notoriously controversial questions surrounding tense and time flow, and was further investigated and elaborated by Lipman [27][28][29]. The central fragmentalist idea is that the world is not a monolithic whole constructed from mutually compatible facts, but rather a collection of fragments, with each fragment containing mutually compatible facts, while different fragments are incompatible.…”

Section: Locality In a Fragmented Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspectival Quantum Realism

Dieks

2022

Found Phys

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The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a perspectival quantum realism. According to this perspectivalism (close to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics) objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner’s friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of fragmentalism.

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Section: Locality In a Fragmented Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspectival Quantum Realism

Dieks

2022

Found Phys

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“…Others have been exploring the possibility of retaining egalitarianism by accepting the incoherence of reality (cf. Lipman 2016) or insisting that reality is irreducibly relative (cf. Fine's (2005) 'external relativism').…”

Section: Coming To Terms With the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds

Merlo

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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This paper presents a distinctively metaphysical version of the problem of other minds. The main source of this version of the problem lies in the principle that, when it comes to consciousness, no distinction can sensibly be drawn between appearance and reality. I will argue that, unless we want to call that principle into question, we should seriously consider the possibility of accepting the conclusion that other minds are not like our own. This option is less problematic than it might seem at first if we are willing to reconceive facts of consciousness as subjective rather than objective in nature.

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“…1 See e.g. Correia and Rosenkranz (2012), Lipman (2015Lipman ( , 2016Lipman ( , 2018, and Loss (2017).…”

Section: Fragmentalism and Its Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?

Iaquinto

Calosi

2020

Philos Stud

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Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state-which he calls conservative realism-according to which: (i) the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, (ii) the quantum (superposition) state is grounded in its terms, and (iii) the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the system in question. We will argue that fragmentalism, at least along the lines proposed by Simon, does not offer a new, satisfactory realistic account of the quantum state. This raises the question about whether there are some other viable forms of quantum fragmentalism.

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Perspectival Variance and Worldly Fragmentation

Cited by 19 publications

References 17 publications

Perspectival Quantum Realism

Perspectival Quantum Realism

The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?

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