The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds

Abstract

This paper presents a distinctively metaphysical version of the problem of other minds. The main source of this version of the problem lies in the principle that, when it comes to consciousness, no distinction can sensibly be drawn between appearance and reality. I will argue that, unless we want to call that principle into question, we should seriously consider the possibility of accepting the conclusion that other minds are not like our own. This option is less problematic than it might seem at first if we are willing to reconceive facts of consciousness as subjective rather than objective in nature.

Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism

“…Our conscious life is rich and varied, but if we abstract away from its detailed character, then we can notice certain "structural" features of consciousness that have proven difficult to explain without First-Person Realism. Below, I will briefly mention two such examples, but further discussion of these and other examples can be found in Merlo (2016Merlo ( , 2021, List (2023), and Lipman (forthcoming). 39 Much of the discussion on why consciousness seems difficult to explain in physicalist terms concerns the qualitative character of consciousness.…”

Foundations of Cooperative AI

“…As in the Prisoner's Dilemma, this outcome is Pareto-dominated by other outcomes (such as the example outcome in parentheses above). 8 However, now imagine 6 For more discussions on these types of questions, see, for example, Valberg (2007); Hare (2007Hare ( , 2009Hare ( , 2010; Merlo (2016Merlo ( , 2021; Conitzer (2019aConitzer ( , 2020.…”