Persons and Moral Status

Abstract

This chapter focuses on moral personhood understood in terms of the notion of moral status. An entity is said to have moral status only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Nonutilitarians tend to think of moral status in terms of entitlements and protections that can conflict with, and sometimes override, doing what would maximize the good and minimize the bad. If moral status comes in degrees, and if there is a status of the highest degree (i.e., full moral status), then moral persons are those with full moral status. After giving a more precise account of it, we assess different views of what it takes to qualify for full moral status (some of which appeal to metaphysical notions of person). We also briefly discuss how metaphysical notions of personhood are put to moral use in utilitarian moral theorizing that eschews the notion of moral personhood.

Lessons from Frankenstein 200 years on: brain organoids, chimaeras and other ‘monsters’

“…This is a controversial question, and there are no clear answers. Different accounts of moral status appeal to as diverse a range of properties as cognitive sophistication, species membership, special relationships, membership in relevant communities and the strength of a being’s interests 26. While we cannot hope to offer a definitive answer here, we do think that Frankenstein can help narrow the range of plausible contenders.…”

Relational nonhuman personhood

“…The objection goes on. The grounds of moral status are distinct from what contributes to flourishing (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2015, 2018). The former, not the latter, determine “moral entitlements.” So the connection between community and flourishing has no bearing on moral status.…”

The problem of equal moral status

“…For recent discussions of the puzzle, see e.g. Christiano (2015), Arneson (2015), McMahan (2008), Carter (2011), Jaworska &Tannenbaum (2019), andWaldron (2017).…”