Persistent Challengers: Repression, Concessions, Challenger Strength, and Commitment in Latin America

Franklin, John

doi:10.17813/maiq.20.1.7613070u562673g1

Cited by 19 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 49 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The existing literature also provides some reasoning for this. Franklin (2015) finds that repression tends to filter out members in the group who are less committed, and hence those who remain tend to be more persistent. Future research can further investigate whether members who join in the subsequent mobilization in the aftermath of repression are significantly different from those who joined prior to repression.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization

Chiang

2021

Conflict Management and Peace Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article examines the conditional effect that repression has on non-violent vs. violent mass mobilization. While governments often resort to violence to deter future mobilization, studies of the repression–dissent nexus have produced divergent evidence with regard to the effect of repression. Many argue that repression tends to backfire, while others demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing mobilization. I argue that the effect of repression varies by differing opposition tactics. I test two competing propositions regarding the effect of repression using event data from the Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 3.0) from 1990 to 2012. The results show that repression, specifically physical repression, of non-violent opposition reduces participation size. Non-physical repression, on the other hand, has less of a deterrence effect on non-violent dissident mobilization.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization

Chiang

2021

Conflict Management and Peace Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Olzak et al 2003), it can also backfire and increase dissent (e.g. Almeida 2003; Francisco 1995), facilitate the formation of alliances between challengers (Chang 2015) or produce more persistent challenges (Franklin 2015).…”

Section: Contentious Politics In Authoritarian Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Zero-Sum Game? Repression and Protest in China

Li¹

2017

Gov. & oppos.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Most scholarship on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes focuses on severe repression and transgressive protest (e.g. revolt), suggesting a zero-sum game played by the state and challengers. However, a burgeoning literature suggests that less brutal forms of authoritarian states have emerged in recent decades and that protesters in these countries tend to limit their challenges, avoiding direct confrontation with the authorities. If so, can the notion of the zero-sum game truly capture the nuances and complexities of contentious politics in authoritarian regimes? Taking the case of China, this article offers a systematic analysis of the pattern of repression and protest in a strong authoritarian state. Drawing on an original data set of 1,418 protest events in China, this article shows that the Chinese state permits some (albeit limited) space for protest and that most protesters confine themselves to this space. These findings thus provide quantitative evidence that popular contention in China is featured by a non-zero-sum game. Overall, this study contributes to a more comprehensive and complex understanding of popular contention in authoritarian settings.

show abstract

“…Since states often resort to repression when confronted with opposition, the ways in which campaigns respond to states' attempts to stop protests, if and how they switch their strategies and tactics, how they preserve their organizational unity all play an important role in determining whether a campaign will demobilize. In his examination of seven randomly selected Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela), Franklin (2015) finds that organizational features play a crucial role in determining if a campaign can survive government repression. If campaigns attract large numbers of participants, challengers will feel more confident that protests will succeed and, hence, will feel more secure.…”

Section: Organizational Level Factors On Demobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, campaigns that have no experience in staging contentious challenges are less resilient and are unable to offset or resist government repression (Franklin, 2015).…”

Section: Organizational Level Factors On Demobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Demobilization of Protest Campaigns

Demirel-Pegg¹

2017

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

All protest campaigns move through cycles of escalation and de-escalation and ultimately demobilize. Some campaigns demobilize quickly as protesters reach their goals. The 2011 Egyptian uprising, when protesters left the streets after they brought down the Mubarak regime, for example, is a case of rapid demobilization. Others, like the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, demobilize over a longer time span before protests come to a complete halt. In Bahrain, the government first cracked down on the opposition by bringing in foreign troops and then continued to repress protesters until the protesters ended the campaign in 2012. Regardless of the length of time it takes for protesters to leave the streets and stop the protests, demobilization is a complex process. Numerous factors, such as severe repression, government concessions, countermobilization of opposition groups, leadership changes, or even unexpected events, can all bring about demobilization. These factors and strategies may occur simultaneously or sequentially, but usually one or a combination of them lead to the demobilization of a protest campaign. Moreover, demobilization is a dynamic process, as it continues to evolve out of the endogenous interactions among governments, challengers, bystanders, and, in some cases, as in Bahrain, external third-party actors. Even though every protest campaign eventually demobilizes one way or another, the demobilization phase has generally attracted less scholarly attention than the onset and escalation of violent and nonviolent forms of collective action. For a long time, most scholars addressed demobilization indirectly within the context of the repression-dissent nexus as they explored why repression backfires and escalates dissent in some cases, while it succeeds in demobilizing the opposition in others. Nonetheless, factors besides state repression contribute to the demobilization of dissent. In other words, a state’s accommodative tactics, as well as individual, organizational, or even regional and systemic factors that interact with the state’s actions, have the potential to shape when and how political dissent demobilizes. More recently, scholars have begun to examine why and how protest campaigns demobilize by stepping out of the repression-dissent nexus and focusing on a variety of other factors related to organizational structures, regime types, individual-level constraints, and contingent events that affect the trajectory of campaigns. At the same time, recent studies on state repression have also begun to focus more heavily on the different causal mechanisms that explain how a state’s repressive tactics can lead to demobilization. While this new line of research has made significant contributions to our understanding of the demobilization of protests, we are still left with important questions about the demobilization process that have yet to be answered.

show abstract

Persistent Challengers: Repression, Concessions, Challenger Strength, and Commitment in Latin America

Cited by 19 publications

References 49 publications

Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization

Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization

A Zero-Sum Game? Repression and Protest in China

The Demobilization of Protest Campaigns

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About