Percolation of interdependent networks with limited knowledge

Abstract

Real-world networks are often not isolated and the interdependence between different networks in a complex system is as important as the topological connectivity within individual networks. We develop a theoretical framework to study the robustness of interdependent networks under attacks with limited knowledge. A node may be attacked if it is the most connected node among a given number of potential victims. This number is referred to as the attacker's knowledge level, which joins the two ends, namely, the random failure with zero knowledge and the intentional attack with full knowledge of the network. We introduce percolation models with attacks over one layer and two layers as well as mixed site-bond percolation. Along with the discontinuous phase transition, we show the existence of a critical knowledge level, which indicates a transition of network robustness under the competition between connectivity and interdependence. It is unraveled that interdependent networks can be extremely fragile to the extent that a random failure on two layers would be more deleterious than a targeted attack with full knowledge over one layer. Moreover, we find that a balanced distribution of attack knowledge on both layers tends to be most destructive if the total knowledge is a conserved quantity.