Perceiving Exploding Tropes

Abstract

The topic of this paper is the perception of properties. It is argued that the perception of properties allows for a distinction between the sense of the identity and the sense of the qualitative nature of a property. So, for example, we might perceive a property as being identical over time even though it is presented as more and more determinate. Thus, you might see an object first as red and then as crimson red. In this case, the property is perceived as identical over time, even though the sense of the qualitative nature (the redness, the crimson redness) of the property is changing. The distinction between the sense of identity and the sense of quality is explicated in terms of perceiving a particular property, a trope, and perceiving it as an instance of a universal. It is subsequently argued that the perceived tropes cannot constitute the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience.

Tropes, Universals and Visual Phenomenology

“…However, the same phenomenon is also believed to be problematic for the universal interpretation of visual properties. In particular, Almäng (2016) has argued that the differences between experiences of property change and experiences of property constancy provide a reason for postulating a non-qualitative aspect of visual properties.…”

“…The first is the "qualitative aspect", which determines how similar a property F is to a property G. Strict similarity is the highest possible level of similarity. The second is the "individuative aspect", which determines whether a property F is identical to a property G (see Almäng, 2016, for a source of this distinction). In response to the Indiscernibility Challenge, a proponent of the universal interpretation may simply identify the qualitative aspect, such as "being a certain shade of red", with the individuative aspect.…”

“…When discussing theories of complex and simple tropes, I treated the qualitative and individuative aspects as constituents of tropes. However, there is an alternative way of conceptualizing the complexity of tropes made in terms of the typetoken distinction (such an idea seems to be presented in Almäng, 2016). According to this approach, a particular redness trope is a token of a universal redness type.…”

“…One argument for the trope interpretation, which will be the focus of this article, is the claim that the way in which we visually experience properties makes it plausible to characterize them as tropes. For instance, it has been stated that when visually experiencing an object as having a property, we are not phenomenally presented with a relation of instantiation between a universal and an object (Mulligan et al, 1984), and that the perceptual phenomenon of visual-property constancy provides a reason to accept the trope interpretation of visual properties (Almäng, 2016).…”

Bradley’s Regress and Visual Content

“…However, such a position entails an implausibly strong conclusion that we cannot perceptually experience colours as being numerically the same in diachronic context. Quite oppositely, it is well-recognized that due to presence of colour constancies people are able to experience a colour as being diachronically the same even despite some changes concerning its qualities (e.g., arising from variations in lighting conditions, see Almäng 2016).…”