Perceived intentionality intensifies blameworthiness of negative behaviors: Blame‐praise asymmetry in intensification effect¹

Abstract

The intensification effect in moral judgment refers to the fact that a behavior elicits more extreme blame or praise when it is intentionally (rather than unintentionally) performed. Two vignette experiments tested the hypothesis that intensification is stronger for blameworthy behaviors than for praiseworthy behaviors. In Study 1, 40 Japanese participants read 10 brief descriptions of negative or positive behaviors. Participants who attributed intentionality to negative (or positive) behaviors rated those behaviors as more blameworthy (or praiseworthy) than those who did not. Study 2 ( N = 94) presented 20 descriptions of behaviors that differed according to a 2 × 2 (valence of behavior: positive vs. negative; intentionality: present vs. absent) between-participants design. Explicit indication of intentionality elevated blameworthiness of negative behaviors but not praiseworthiness of positive behaviors.Key words: attribution of responsibility, intentionality, intensification effect, folk theory of mind and behavior.

Remembering Helpers and Hinderers Depends on Behavioral Intentions of the Agent and Psychopathic Characteristics of the Observer

“…For example, adults assign more blame or praise to intentional actions compared to unintentional actions (e.g., Ohtsubo, 2007) and are more likely to retaliate or reciprocate when harmful or helpful actions are intentional (e.g., Swap, 1991). Even children as young as three years of age allocate more responsibility for actions that are considered intentional (e.g., Nunez and Harris, 1998), and toddlers younger than 2 years consider an individual's previous intention to provide a desired object when determining whether to help her (Dunfield and Kuhlmeier, 2010).…”

Put your plan into action: The influence of action plans on agency and responsibility.

“…If a person is observing another agent, cues related to planning by that other person increase our perceptions of re sponsibility and accountability. While the relation between intentionality, planning, and attributions of responsibility toward others has been a well established finding (Cushman et a l, 2006;Greene & Haidt, 2002;Hamilton, 1978;Lagnado & Channon, 2008;Ohtsubo, 2007;Shaver, 1985;Weiner, 1995) the present work therefore expands this literature by showing the reverse effect in agents. Such actor-observer discrepancies have been illustrated in a number of other domains.…”

“…As in those studies, participants were asked to plan ahead, and were also able to act by indicating their decision, thereby incorporating to some degree the actual behavior in these paradigms. Additionally, the link between perceived in tentionality and attributions of responsibility to another indi vidual, as shown in Study 8, has been extensively documented in other literature using a wide range of methods (e.g., Cushman et al, 2006;Greene & Haidt, 2002;Hamilton, 1978;Lagnado & Channon, 2008;Ohtsubo, 2007;Shaver, 1985;Weiner, 1995). A second important consideration here is that some inferences that can be drawn by comparing the studies indeed rely upon differences between separate studies, and not on factors manip ulated within one experimental design.…”

Causes, reasons, and intent: Integrating attribution and social inference

“…For example, Wright and Bengson (2009) offer "probably, yes" and "probably, no" as responses to the question of whether a behavior was intentional. Recent research in the area most commonly uses seven-or eight-point scales to assess level of intent (e.g., Hughes & Trafimow, 2010;Ohtsubo, 2007). In addition, studies vary with regard to whether they include more than one item to assess intentionality.…”

“…These items often use seven-or eight-point response scales (Hughes, 2010;Ohtsubo, 2007), but alternatively may utilize as few as two response options (Wright, 2009;Knobe, 2003). Hughes (2010) …”