People Flows in Globalization

Freeman, Robert

doi:10.3386/w12315

Cited by 56 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…However, they are not distributed equally across all countries. Developed countries have about two-thirds of all the immigrants, where the foreign born constitute about 9% of the population, whereas developing countries have the remaining immigrants, where they constitute about 1.5% of the population (Freeman 2006). This study focuses on foreign-born people in the United States and, more specifically, on those who are non-U.S. citizen IT professionals.…”

Section: Foreign It Professionals In the United Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Foreign IT Workers Cheaper? U.S. Visa Policies and Compensation of Information Technology Professionals

2010

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T he use of H-1B and other work visas to hire foreign information technology (IT) professionals in the UnitedStates has attracted significant controversy and policy debates. On one hand, hiring high-skill foreign IT professionals on work visas can be advantageous for U.S. firms and the overall economy. On the other hand, high-skill immigration can adversely impact the wages of foreign and American IT professionals. This study uses data on skills and compensation of more than 50,000 IT professionals in the United States over the period [2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005] to study patterns in compensation of foreign and American IT professionals to inform these debates. Contrary to the popular belief that foreign workers are a cheap source of labor for U.S. firms, we find that after controlling for their human capital attributes, foreign IT professionals (those without U.S. citizenship and those with H-1B or other work visas) earn a salary premium when compared with IT professionals with U.S. citizenship. The salary premiums for non-U.S. citizens and for those on work visas fluctuate in response to supply shocks created by the annual caps on new H-1B visas. Setting lower and fully utilized annual caps results in higher salary premiums for non-U.S. citizens and those with work visas. We discuss implications of this study for crafting informed visa-and immigration-related policies by the U.S. government, for staffing practices of firms, and for human capital investments by IT professionals.

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Section: Foreign It Professionals In the United Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Foreign IT Workers Cheaper? U.S. Visa Policies and Compensation of Information Technology Professionals

2010

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“…The main idea is that skill shortages in certain key areas need to be addressed in a systematic way and that, only by granting access to an EU-wide labour market, the sought-off talents can be attracted. 10 Finally, the data in Table 1 suggest that while -as many observers have pointed out (Freeman 2006, Pritchett 2006) -the international movement of labour is in many ways small, especially when compared to trade and capital movements, 11 it is far from being 10 The more general importance of coordinating migration policies at the EU level has been clearly spelled out in the 2005 The Hague program. See also Boeri and Bruecker (2005) for a discussion.…”

Section: Stylized Facts On International Migration and Migration Polimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One way of tackling this question is to consider the degree of price dispersion for similar goods/factor services. As Freeman (2006) points out "…differences in the dispersion of wages and prices suggest that globalization has not reduced the differences among similarly skilled workers as much as it has reduced price differences and differences in cost of capital." See also Faini (2006) and Pritchett (2006). negligible.…”

Section: Stylized Facts On International Migration and Migration Polimentioning

confidence: 99%

From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence

Facchini¹,

Mayda²

Economic Policy

111

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence Giovanni Facchini Anna Maria Mayda D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence *In democratic societies individual attitudes of voters represent the foundations of policy making. We start by analyzing patterns in public opinion on migration and find that, across countries of different income levels, only a small minority of voters favour more open migration policies. Next we investigate the determinants of voters' preferences towards immigration from a theoretical and empirical point of view. Our analysis supports the role played by economic channels (labour market, welfare state, efficiency gains) using both the 1995 and 2003 rounds of the ISSP survey. The second part of the paper examines how attitudes translate into a migration policy outcome. We consider two alternative politicaleconomy frameworks: the median voter and the interest groups model. On the one hand, the restrictive policies in place across destination countries and the very low fractions of voters favouring immigration are consistent with the median voter framework. At the same time, given the extent of individual-level opposition to immigration that appears in the data, it is somewhat puzzling, in a median-voter perspective, that migration flows take place at all. Interest-groups dynamics have the potential to explain this puzzle. We find evidence from regression analysis supporting both political-economy frameworks.JEL Classification: F22, J61

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“…The idea proposed by Freeman (2006) and Becker (2011), among others, is as follows. If the private returns from migration, as measured by a prospective migrant's earnings, increase with the migrant's skill level, then it would be more beneficial for high-skilled individuals to migrate than for low-skilled individuals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Critical Comparison of Migration Policies: Entry Fee Versus Quota

et al. 2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We are indebted to two referees for thoughtful and inspiring comments, and to Giovanni Peri for advice, guidance, patience, and encouragement. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe ask which migration policy a developed country will choose when its objective is to attain the optimal skill composition of the country's workforce, and when the policy menu consists of an entry fee and a quota. We compare these two policies under the assumptions that individuals are heterogeneous in their skill level as well as in their skill type, and that individuals of one skill type, say "scientists," confer a positive externality on overall productivity whereas individuals of the other skill type, say "managers," do not confer such an externality. We find that a uniform entry fee encourages self-selection such that the migrants are only or mostly highly skilled managers. The (near) absence of migrant scientists has a negative effect on the productivity of the country's workforce. Under a quota: the migrants are (a) only averagely skilled managers if the productivity externality generated by the scientists is weak, or (b) only averagely skilled scientists if the productivity externality generated by the scientists is strong. In (a), a uniform entry fee is preferable to a quota. In (b), a quota is preferable to a uniform entry fee. If, however, the entry fee for scientists is sufficiently below the entry fee for managers, then migrants will be only or mostly highly skilled scientists, rendering a differentiated entry fee preferable to a quota even when the productivity externality is strong. Instituting a differentiated fee comes, though, at a cost: the fee revenue is not as high as it will be when migrants are only or mostly managers. We conclude that if maximizing the revenue from the entry fee is not the primary objective of the developed country, then a differentiated entry fee is the preferred policy.

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People Flows in Globalization

Cited by 56 publications

References 27 publications

Are Foreign IT Workers Cheaper? U.S. Visa Policies and Compensation of Information Technology Professionals

Are Foreign IT Workers Cheaper? U.S. Visa Policies and Compensation of Information Technology Professionals

From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence

A Critical Comparison of Migration Policies: Entry Fee Versus Quota

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