From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence Giovanni Facchini Anna Maria Mayda D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence *In democratic societies individual attitudes of voters represent the foundations of policy making. We start by analyzing patterns in public opinion on migration and find that, across countries of different income levels, only a small minority of voters favour more open migration policies. Next we investigate the determinants of voters' preferences towards immigration from a theoretical and empirical point of view. Our analysis supports the role played by economic channels (labour market, welfare state, efficiency gains) using both the 1995 and 2003 rounds of the ISSP survey. The second part of the paper examines how attitudes translate into a migration policy outcome. We consider two alternative politicaleconomy frameworks: the median voter and the interest groups model. On the one hand, the restrictive policies in place across destination countries and the very low fractions of voters favouring immigration are consistent with the median voter framework. At the same time, given the extent of individual-level opposition to immigration that appears in the data, it is somewhat puzzling, in a median-voter perspective, that migration flows take place at all. Interest-groups dynamics have the potential to explain this puzzle. We find evidence from regression analysis supporting both political-economy frameworks.JEL Classification: F22, J61

Lobbying Expenditures on Migration: a Descriptive Analysis

“…The heads of the supermarket chain Sainsburys and the head of the European division of the investment bank Merrill Lynch were among the signatories. 16 See, for example, Facchini and Mayda (2008). This paper's results are consistent with the fact that, in recent years, U.S. labor unions have substantially toned down the rhetoric against migration.…”

“…), by performing a falsification exercise and, finally, by using an instrumental-variable estimation strategy. Facchini and Mayda (2008) focus, instead, on cleavages across occupation/skill lines, rather than across sectors. Using a panel covering the period 1994-2005 and differentiating labour according to both skill levels and occupations, the paper finds systematic evidence suggesting that the lobbying activity of organized labour leads to a reduction in the inflow of foreign workers in the same occupation/education cell -this effect is driven by substitutability -and to an increase in the inflow of foreign workers in different occupation/education cells -this effect is driven by complementarity.…”

“…5 The fraction of voters in favour of further immigration was also very low in 2003 (Mayda 2006). According to the ISSP survey carried out in that year, 6 only 11 percent of respondents was in favour of increasing the number of foreigners allowed into the country (Facchini and Mayda 2008). 7 More recently, a survey carried out by the German Marshall Fund revealed that, in 2011, in five European countries 8 only 4 percent of the population felt that there were too few immigrants -i.e., only 4 percent of the population was presumably in favour of a more open policy stance -while 47 percent felt that there were too many of them.…”

“…16 While anecdotal evidence on the role played by interest groups is abundant, systematic empirical analyses are scarce. The only studies in the literature, which empirically investigate the political economy of migration policy, with a specific focus on lobbying activity, are Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001), Facchini and Mayda (2008), Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2013) (details of each paper are described in Section 2.). In particular, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) analyze the impact of lobbying activity on migration policy in the U.S. using a newly available dataset on lobbying expenditures on immigration.…”

Public Opinion and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act

“…Studies by both Nisbet (2005) and Ho, Brossard, and Scheufele (2008) illustrated that ideology was a significant predictor of support for stem cell research. Finally, Facchini and Mayda (2008) found that "political affiliation with the right" was negatively correlated with immigration reform opinions allowing for more open borders. The studies by Hicks and Lee, and Haider-Markel and Joslyn were explanatory studies, utilizing advanced statistical modeling techniques.…”