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2004
DOI: 10.1017/s135732170000297x
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Pension Scheme Asset Allocation with Taxation Arbitrage, Risk Sharing and Default Insurance

Abstract: The asset allocation is a crucial decision for pension funds, and this paper analyses the economic factors which determine this choice. The analysis proceeds on the basis that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation between equities and bonds is indeterminate and governed by the risk/return preferences of the trustees and the employer. If the employing company and its shareholders are subject to taxation, there is a tax advantage in a largely bond allocation. Risk … Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…These significant increases in investment risk taken on are due to the reduced weighting to the risk of being in deficit under SG and LG, allowing the employer-sponsor to attempt to reduce contributions by taking on this investment risk. This is consistent with the theoretical results of previous papers such as Sutcliffe (2004) relating to the PBGC in the U.S., even though the objective function in this paper does not provide any benefit for surplus. However, the increase is much higher than that observed by Crossley & Jametti (2011), with equity allocations for schemes in Canada under the effect of default insurance being consistent with an attempt to reduce levy payments rather than trying to game the default insurer.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 92%
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“…These significant increases in investment risk taken on are due to the reduced weighting to the risk of being in deficit under SG and LG, allowing the employer-sponsor to attempt to reduce contributions by taking on this investment risk. This is consistent with the theoretical results of previous papers such as Sutcliffe (2004) relating to the PBGC in the U.S., even though the objective function in this paper does not provide any benefit for surplus. However, the increase is much higher than that observed by Crossley & Jametti (2011), with equity allocations for schemes in Canada under the effect of default insurance being consistent with an attempt to reduce levy payments rather than trying to game the default insurer.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 92%
“…Early PBGC-based studies focused on the incentives of the employer-sponsor to reduce funding levels and increase investment risk due to the put option offered by the PBGC protection (see for example Sharpe (1976), Treynor (1977) and Niehaus (1990). A similar argument is made by Sutcliffe, 2004). These incentives were exacerbated by the flat premium structure that was unrelated to the risks of the scheme 5 and hence did not penalise employers in terms of higher premiums for lower funding levels.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 75%
“…Three factors are excluded from this analysis, but are considered at length in Sutcliffe (2004) -taxation, risk sharing and default insurance 2 . Analysis of the reasons advanced for the cult which attitudes towards the cult of the equity, with the asset allocation decision depending on which group prevails.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If the shares of capital and labour in national income remain constant, then equities and salaries are expected to increase at the same long run rate. Therefore, equities provide a good hedge for salaries over the long run, and so, as well as reducing the cost of 16 The risk sharing aspects of the problem are considered in Sutcliffe (2004).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
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