Abstract:The UK defined benefit pension scheme landscape has changed dramatically over the last few decades. During this period of change, conflicting views regarding the measurement of both assets and liabilities has made communication challenging. This has led to an under appreciation of risk and often suboptimal decision making. This paper seeks to draw together a variety of contrasting views to provide a coherent framework for stakeholders to meet pension scheme obligations over time.The proposed framework encourag… Show more
“…In other cases, the valuation here proposed will help meet the need for the target to relate to solvency (Chapman et al, 2001) and to do so clearly (Cowling et al, 2005). Hatchett et al (2013) argued that a target set using market values (as is the benchmark valuation here) is helpful, by being objective, clarifying the reliance on the firm and what is the matching portfolio (from which departures may be made).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further support for market values is from Hatchett et al (2013), who asserted that a scheme's assets will ultimately be valued at market value on the date of settlement (either by paying a benefit to a member or a transfer to another party such as an insurer), meaning that market values are relevant even if scheme decision-makers believe the market is distorted in some way.…”
Section: Valuation Of Assetsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A further possibility is to use swaps, with a credit risk adjustment for bank default, as prescribed by Solvency II. Hatchett et al (2013) suggested that, in the UK context, readers might think of risk-free assets as gilts or suitably well-collateralised swaps with a sufficiently reliable counterparty. Charmaille et al (2013) regarded the normal position to be for swap rates to exceed gilt yields, although this could be reversed in certain circumstances; Foroughi (2012) put forward possible explanations for negative swap spreads at medium to long durations.…”
Section: Discount Rate: Matching or Budgeting Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cowling et al (2005) are concerned that using a discount rate higher than that derived from a matching portfolio is simply a way of reducing the contribution rate at the expense of higher contributions later and lower member security: "an element of self-delusion within the actuarial profession" they called it (page 78). Hatchett et al (2013) accept that, while schemes may wish to take investment risks in order to reduce the cost to the firm, they have a concern that, under current regulations, stakeholders "could change the asset allocation to 'hide' the deficit" (page 292). The author would say that using a budgeting framework means that the liabilities appear to magically reduce if the firm decides to adopt a more risky investment strategy with higher expected returns, and that this is quite wrong: the liabilities depend on factors such as service, salaries and mortality.…”
Section: Discount Rate: Matching or Budgeting Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is fair to add that one paper, a report for the National Association of Pension Funds by Clacher & Moizer (2011), recommends the liabilities be discounted at a rate that reflects the scheme's investment strategy, and this to be combined with a value of assets smoothed to reflect the long-term nature of the pension obligation. However, Clacher has clarified that this proposal is specifically in relation to company accounts rather than valuations for trustees, etc (see comments in the discussion on Hatchett et al, 2013).…”
Section: Discount Rate: Matching or Budgeting Approach?mentioning
This paper is motivated by The Pensions Regulator (TPR)’s review of its Code of Practice on funding for defined benefit schemes and aims to suggest how trustees and regulators should monitor the extent to which scheme assets are adequate to cover liabilities. It concludes that current practice is inadequate and needs to change.
A review is carried out of papers on not only this subject but also (to collect ideas rather than automatically apply them to pensions solvency valuations) pensions and insurance accounting and regulation.
Current practice is “scheme-specific funding” which permits discretion on choice of discount rates and other assumptions; the paper is concerned that this can lead to bias, and that trends in a scheme’s solvency can be obscured by changing assumptions. This also leads to the funding ratio communicated to scheme members having little meaning.
The paper suggests that regulators should require a valuation that is based on sound principles, objective, fair, neutral, transparent and feasible. A prescribed methodology would replace discretion.
It concludes that the benefits to be valued are those arising on discontinuance of the scheme, without allowing for future salary-related benefit increases, which are felt to no longer be a constructive obligation of employers.
The valuation should, it is suggested, use market values of assets, which is largely current practice.
Liabilities should reflect the trustees fulfilling their liabilities, rather than transferring them to an insurer (which may introduce artificialities).
The discount rate should follow the “matching” approach, being a market-consistent risk-free rate: this is consistent with several papers to the profession in recent years. It avoids the problems of the “budgeting” approach, where the discount rate is based on the expected return on assets – this can be used to help set contribution levels but is not suitable for determining the value of liabilities, which depends on salary, service, longevity, etc and (very largely) not on the assets held. In principle, the liability value can be adjusted for illiquidity. Credit risk of the employer should not be allowed for.
Liabilities should reflect the (probability-weighted) expected value of future cash flows and should not be increased by prudent margins or risk margins (which would lead to a non-neutral figure). Risk disclosures are needed to understand and manage risks.
The resulting funding ratio is a consistent measure, to be disclosed to members, which can be used to manage the scheme, and by regulators as the basis for requiring action. Scheme-specific management using data such as the employer covenant means that immediate action to ensure 100% solvency on the proposed basis would not necessarily be appropriate.
The author encourages the profession to advise TPR on the above lines.
“…In other cases, the valuation here proposed will help meet the need for the target to relate to solvency (Chapman et al, 2001) and to do so clearly (Cowling et al, 2005). Hatchett et al (2013) argued that a target set using market values (as is the benchmark valuation here) is helpful, by being objective, clarifying the reliance on the firm and what is the matching portfolio (from which departures may be made).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further support for market values is from Hatchett et al (2013), who asserted that a scheme's assets will ultimately be valued at market value on the date of settlement (either by paying a benefit to a member or a transfer to another party such as an insurer), meaning that market values are relevant even if scheme decision-makers believe the market is distorted in some way.…”
Section: Valuation Of Assetsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A further possibility is to use swaps, with a credit risk adjustment for bank default, as prescribed by Solvency II. Hatchett et al (2013) suggested that, in the UK context, readers might think of risk-free assets as gilts or suitably well-collateralised swaps with a sufficiently reliable counterparty. Charmaille et al (2013) regarded the normal position to be for swap rates to exceed gilt yields, although this could be reversed in certain circumstances; Foroughi (2012) put forward possible explanations for negative swap spreads at medium to long durations.…”
Section: Discount Rate: Matching or Budgeting Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cowling et al (2005) are concerned that using a discount rate higher than that derived from a matching portfolio is simply a way of reducing the contribution rate at the expense of higher contributions later and lower member security: "an element of self-delusion within the actuarial profession" they called it (page 78). Hatchett et al (2013) accept that, while schemes may wish to take investment risks in order to reduce the cost to the firm, they have a concern that, under current regulations, stakeholders "could change the asset allocation to 'hide' the deficit" (page 292). The author would say that using a budgeting framework means that the liabilities appear to magically reduce if the firm decides to adopt a more risky investment strategy with higher expected returns, and that this is quite wrong: the liabilities depend on factors such as service, salaries and mortality.…”
Section: Discount Rate: Matching or Budgeting Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is fair to add that one paper, a report for the National Association of Pension Funds by Clacher & Moizer (2011), recommends the liabilities be discounted at a rate that reflects the scheme's investment strategy, and this to be combined with a value of assets smoothed to reflect the long-term nature of the pension obligation. However, Clacher has clarified that this proposal is specifically in relation to company accounts rather than valuations for trustees, etc (see comments in the discussion on Hatchett et al, 2013).…”
Section: Discount Rate: Matching or Budgeting Approach?mentioning
This paper is motivated by The Pensions Regulator (TPR)’s review of its Code of Practice on funding for defined benefit schemes and aims to suggest how trustees and regulators should monitor the extent to which scheme assets are adequate to cover liabilities. It concludes that current practice is inadequate and needs to change.
A review is carried out of papers on not only this subject but also (to collect ideas rather than automatically apply them to pensions solvency valuations) pensions and insurance accounting and regulation.
Current practice is “scheme-specific funding” which permits discretion on choice of discount rates and other assumptions; the paper is concerned that this can lead to bias, and that trends in a scheme’s solvency can be obscured by changing assumptions. This also leads to the funding ratio communicated to scheme members having little meaning.
The paper suggests that regulators should require a valuation that is based on sound principles, objective, fair, neutral, transparent and feasible. A prescribed methodology would replace discretion.
It concludes that the benefits to be valued are those arising on discontinuance of the scheme, without allowing for future salary-related benefit increases, which are felt to no longer be a constructive obligation of employers.
The valuation should, it is suggested, use market values of assets, which is largely current practice.
Liabilities should reflect the trustees fulfilling their liabilities, rather than transferring them to an insurer (which may introduce artificialities).
The discount rate should follow the “matching” approach, being a market-consistent risk-free rate: this is consistent with several papers to the profession in recent years. It avoids the problems of the “budgeting” approach, where the discount rate is based on the expected return on assets – this can be used to help set contribution levels but is not suitable for determining the value of liabilities, which depends on salary, service, longevity, etc and (very largely) not on the assets held. In principle, the liability value can be adjusted for illiquidity. Credit risk of the employer should not be allowed for.
Liabilities should reflect the (probability-weighted) expected value of future cash flows and should not be increased by prudent margins or risk margins (which would lead to a non-neutral figure). Risk disclosures are needed to understand and manage risks.
The resulting funding ratio is a consistent measure, to be disclosed to members, which can be used to manage the scheme, and by regulators as the basis for requiring action. Scheme-specific management using data such as the employer covenant means that immediate action to ensure 100% solvency on the proposed basis would not necessarily be appropriate.
The author encourages the profession to advise TPR on the above lines.
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