Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence

Kelly, Thomas

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007

Cited by 411 publications

(289 citation statements)

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“…See, e.g., Kelly [2010] for an example of this objection in the context of peer disagreement; see Christensen [2007 b] and [2011] for responses. See also Weatherson [ms] for more extensive criticism of views on which accommodating higher-order evidence requires us to "screen off" first-order evidence completely.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Respecting all the evidence

Sliwa

Horowitz

2015

Philos Stud

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Respecting all the evidence

Sliwa

Horowitz

2015

Philos Stud

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“…. Â W 1 v. That convergence can be interpreted in two ways: as repeated opinion updating (all W k are equal to each other) where differences vanish in the limit only, or as an aggregation of different types of information (Kelly 2010) that correspond to different stages of the convergence process (the W k can be different). We believe that either interpretation fails to achieve normative uniqueness, and does not convince on a descriptive level either.…”

Section: The Problems With Convergencementioning

confidence: 99%

Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

Martini

Sprenger

Colyvan

2012

Erkenn

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This paper explores the scope and limits of rational consensus through mutual respect, with the primary focus on the best known formal model of consensus: the Lehrer-Wagner model. We consider various arguments against the rationality of the Lehrer-Wagner model as a model of consensus about factual matters. We conclude that models such as this face problems in achieving rational consensus on disagreements about unknown factual matters, but that they hold considerable promise as models of how to rationally resolve non-factual disagreements.

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“…For in both cases we can still evaluate how well these strategies do with respect to tracking the truth. 9 It should be noted that on our approach the rationality of a strategy does not depend in any way on 'right reasoning' at the first stage, during the initial assessment of the evidence, like it does in Kelly (2005Kelly ( , 2010. Our approach is more akin to Christensen (2007) or Elga (2007), where a rational strategy is to be determined independent of one's initial reasoning behind the disputed belief.…”

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confidence: 95%

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement

Heesen

Kolk

2016

Erkenn

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In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies-in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View-are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.

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Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence

Cited by 411 publications

References 5 publications

Respecting all the evidence

Respecting all the evidence

Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement

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