A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement

Abstract

In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies-in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View-are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.

On the Accuracy of Group Credences

“…That is, I'll be concerned with defending a norm for group credences understood as summaries of the 1 Of course, much thought has been given to how you should respond when you learn of someone else's credences; this is the focus of the peer disagreement literature. For accuracy-based analyses of this problem, see (Moss, 2011;Staffel, 2015;Levinstein, 2015;Heesen & van der Kolk, 2016). Also, if the members of the group share the same prior probabilities, Robert Aumann's famous Agreement Theorem shows that there is just one rational way for members of the group to respond-they must all end up with the same credence function once they have updated on the common knowledge of one another's posterior probabilities (Aumann, 1976).…”