Peaceful Uncertainty: When Power Shocks Do Not Create Commitment Problems

Abstract

Does a shock to the balance of power cause the favored actor to exploit its newfound advantage by initiating conflict? The main assumption in the modeling literature on commitment problems as a source of war is that states know and anticipate power shifts. We relax this assumption such that states must estimate future power shifts by looking at past and present capabilities of themselves and their adversaries. We incorporate these estimates and their attendant uncertainty into a model of war and find that while commitment problems are a source of war, the existing models overpredict war by ignoring this dynamic. States continuously updating their estimates and accounting for uncertainty promotes peace. One implication is that an apparent window of opportunity in which the power balance is suddenly favorable is less problematic than previously theorized. This result has applications to nuclear proliferation dynamics as well as shifting power and conflict generally. We find empirical support for the model in tests analyzing power shifts and interstate wars.

Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty

“…In addition, this paper speaks to a broader literature of inter-state crisis bargaining. While the mainstream wisdom indicates that increasing uncertainty stokes conflict (Reed, 2003b; Slantchev, 2004), some studies have contended that uncertainty also rewards prudence (Bas and Schub, 2016) and may result in a more peaceful outcome depending on the source of uncertainty (Fey and Ramsay, 2011), whether there is ongoing concern over commitment problems (Wolford et al, 2011; Bas and Schub, 2017), and prior optimistic/pessimistic beliefs (Arena and Wolford, 2012). My study adds to the latter caution and shows that the mechanism of economic dependence can promote peace even when it renders states less certain of an opponent’s resolve.…”

The Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Uncertainty and Conflict in International Relations

“…2 conflict when a temporarily strong actor expects to revert to a weaker position in the future. This dynamic which produces conflict generalizes to multilateral settings as well ) but attenuates when actors are uncertain about the precise random process dictating power balance fluctuations (Bas and Schub, 2017).…”

“…Temporarily advantaged states attack rivals during the latter's window of vulnerability. That is, when a stochastic process yields a favorable power balance-say, due to domestic turmoil in a rival-states seize the opportunity to attack rather than suffer adverse bargains once the rival's turmoil dwindles (Bas and Schub, 2017). However, this result attenuates when the privileged state is uncertain whether its newfound advantage is temporary or likely to endure.…”

Seizing a Window of Opportunity? The Causes and Consequences of the 2020 Sino-Indian Border Stand-off

“…34–35). However, those states that are concerned that the future balance of power will be against them or that a vital interest is at stake may also seize upon a window before it closes in order to secure their advantageous position or prevent it from deteriorating further (Bas & Schub, 2017, p. 851; Levy, 1987, pp. 86–88; Van Evera, 1999, pp.…”