Patterns of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective

Flanigan, William H.; Fogelman, Edwin

doi:10.2307/421499

Cited by 43 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Democracies tend to enjoy greater acceptance among the general population, so dissatisfaction is not frequently expressed in the form of serious challenges to the regime. Actors can channel their expressions within the democratic system, thereby reducing the likelihood of outright rebellion (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975;Flanagan & Fogelman, 1971;Rummel, 1995). Rupesinghe (1992) and others, noting the re-kindling of conflict in Eastern Europe after the Cold War, have suggested that a democratic regime may permit suppressed conflicts to break into the open, in contrast to the situation under an authoritarian regime.…”

Section: From Democracy To Domestic Peacementioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution,and Political Unrest

Gissinger

Gleditsch

1999

JWSR

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The consequences of globalization for the development of a more peaceful world remain highly controversial. This article seeks to clarify the impact that the globalization of the economy may have on civil war and political instability. Liberals argue that countries heavily dependent on the global economy (whether measured by trade or investment) are likely to experience higher economic growth, greater affluence, more democracy, and increasingly peaceful conditions at home and abroad. In stark contrast, most dependency theorists argue that high levels of trade and investment tend to generate greater economic inequality. Relative deprivation theory suggests that such inequality will increase the risk of political instability. From these two broad perspectives, a set of hypotheses is developed and tested on a global dataset for the period 1965-93. The consequences of an open economy prove to be quite complex. A high level of trade does generate more domestic peace; at the same time, direct foreign investment also creates conditions conducive to political instability. However, the consequences of trade are dependent on what is being exported. Exports of manufactured goods create high levels of welfare and equality, while exports of agricultural products promote poverty and inequality. Inequality emerges as but one of many factors which lead to political instability.

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Section: From Democracy To Domestic Peacementioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution,and Political Unrest

Gissinger

Gleditsch

1999

JWSR

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“…Empirical research on this topic is heavily concentrated on data from the mid-and late fifties with some extensions into the 1960s. While this problem has been one of the most heavily researched in quantitative international politics (Rummel, 1963;Haas, 1965;Tanter, 1966;Wilkenfeld, 1968Wilkenfeld, , 1969Wilkenfeld, , 1972Flanigan andFogelman, 1970: Burrowes andSpector, 1973;Collins, 1973;Hazlewood, 1973Hazlewood, , 1975Liao, 1976: Eberwein et al, 1978summaries in McGowan and Shapiro, 1973;Zinnes, 1975;Zimmermann, 1975Zimmermann, , 1976), clarity has not yet been achieved. There seems to be no significant relationship over all nations during the 1950s (Rummel, 1963;Tanter, 1966), but there tnight be at least a spurious ohe for the midsixties (Eberwein et al, 1978).…”

Section: Empirical Evidence On Ddtente-related Propositionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Threats to Détente: Intuitive Hopes and Counterintuitive Realities

Weede¹

1977

European J Political Res

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The theoretical perspective behind détente is elaborated. While avoidance of war is the major goal, cooperation, tension‐reduction and improvement of domestic societies are the major means. Cooperation includes trade, legal commitments, functional cooperation within IGOs and routine diplomacy. Tension reduction includes less verbal conflict, less defense expenditures, a slower arms race and possibly multipolarization. Improvement of domestic socieities refers to stability, egalitarianism and democracy within nations. All those détente‐related propositions about means‐ends‐relationships are scrutinized from a quantitative international politics perspective. In general, propositions receive little or no support. A tentative explanation why is suggested by reference to an alternative theoretical framework. It is argued that détente neither affects the security dilemma nor territorial problems nor ideological dissens enough to overcome still irreconcilable conflicts of interest. As long as there are such conflicts of interest, meaningful victory has to be ruled out by deterrence in order to avoid war. While deterrence may help us to survive in the short run, it guarantees doom in the long run. So, there is some true insight behind the drive for détente. Nevertheless détente may prove counterproductive, because it might promote multipolarization and finally nuclear proliferation. While we badly need something better and safer than deterrence, détente doesn't seem to be the solution to our problems of survival.

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“…Instead we confine ourselves to the simple question: does internal conflict correlate with external conflict at all? This restriction is necessary for two reasons: first, the extensive literature on this subject (Rummel, 1963;Haas, 1965;Tanter, 1966;Wilkenfeld, 1968Wilkenfeld, , 1969Wilkenfeld, , 1972Flanigan and Fogelman, 1970;Burrowes and Spector, 1973;Collins, 1973;Hazelwood, 1973Hazelwood, , 1975Liao, 1976; summaries by McGowan and Shapiro, 1973;Zimmerman, 1975Zimmerman, , 1976Zinnes, 1975) is full of contradictions and does not yet allow an answer to the question of whether a significant cross-sectional correlation exists. Second, the causal explanation of such a correlation can only be tested adequately either when reliable time-series of internal and external conflict data are available, or when sufficient data on different known determinants of external and internal conflicts are ready for use.…”

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confidence: 97%

External and Internal Conflict Behavior Among Nations, 1966-1967

Eberwein

Hübner-Dick²,

Jagodzinski

et al. 1979

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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In this article we attempt to replicate the hypothesis tested by Rummel and others that external and internal conflict are unrelated. We do this using data for 125 nations for the years 1966-1967. As did Rummel, we use exploratory factor analysis and regression analysis; in addition, we also employ confirmatory factor analysis. Results from confirmatory factor analysis contradict Rummel and reveal moderately strong correlations between internal and external conflict factors. Regression analysis and partial correlations, however, show that zero-order cross-country correlations between internal and external conflict are reduced to insignificance when a control variable, population size, is introduced in the analysis.

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Patterns of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective

Cited by 43 publications

References 0 publications

Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution,and Political Unrest

Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution,and Political Unrest

Threats to Détente: Intuitive Hopes and Counterintuitive Realities

External and Internal Conflict Behavior Among Nations, 1966-1967

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