Threats to Détente: Intuitive Hopes and Counterintuitive Realities

Abstract

The theoretical perspective behind détente is elaborated. While avoidance of war is the major goal, cooperation, tension‐reduction and improvement of domestic societies are the major means. Cooperation includes trade, legal commitments, functional cooperation within IGOs and routine diplomacy. Tension reduction includes less verbal conflict, less defense expenditures, a slower arms race and possibly multipolarization. Improvement of domestic socieities refers to stability, egalitarianism and democracy within nations. All those détente‐related propositions about means‐ends‐relationships are scrutinized from a quantitative international politics perspective. In general, propositions receive little or no support. A tentative explanation why is suggested by reference to an alternative theoretical framework. It is argued that détente neither affects the security dilemma nor territorial problems nor ideological dissens enough to overcome still irreconcilable conflicts of interest. As long as there are such conflicts of interest, meaningful victory has to be ruled out by deterrence in order to avoid war. While deterrence may help us to survive in the short run, it guarantees doom in the long run. So, there is some true insight behind the drive for détente. Nevertheless détente may prove counterproductive, because it might promote multipolarization and finally nuclear proliferation. While we badly need something better and safer than deterrence, détente doesn't seem to be the solution to our problems of survival.

Some (Western) Dilemmas in Managing Extended Deterrence

“…In the economic realm, increased demand is a more typical result of falling prices. (For criticisms of detente-related hopes, see Liska 1975;Nitze 1976;Rummel 1976;Tullock 1974;Weede 1977). Moreover, the implications of detente as a formula for managing the American decline have been ill understood.…”

The concept of detente

“…One writer has asserted that detente 'is an instrumental policy rather than a goal-state valuable in itself and can only be evaluated in terms of the goals that detente is instrumental in achieving. 33 Clearly, some analysis of particular detente policies is necessary to test this assertion.…”