Party support or personal resources? Factors of success in the plurality portion of the 1999 national legislative elections in Russia

Golosov, Grigorii V.

doi:10.1016/s0967-067x(01)00022-8

Cited by 24 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…In some less established systems, such as Russia and the Ukraine, research has suggested that the number of successful independent candidates indicates how politicians can be electorally viable without partisan affiliation (Birch, 1998;Golosov, 2002;Moser, 1999). A more substantial impediment to party development is the influence of other key groups.…”

Section: Institutionalization In the Post-communist Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, while parties are important for reducing the costs of organization and mobilization of voters, in less established systems this is not always the case. In some less established systems, such as Russia and the Ukraine, research has suggested that the number of successful independent candidates indicates how politicians can be electorally viable without partisan affiliation (Birch, 1998;Golosov, 2002;Moser, 1999). A more substantial impediment to party development is the influence of other key groups.…”

Section: Institutionalization In the Post-communist Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance on Party System Institutionalization

Booth

Robbins

2010

Party Politics

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A B S T R A C TThere are numerous advantages to institutionalized party systems; yet the instability in post-communist party systems has been well documented. Thus, it is increasingly important to understand how parties become institutionalized. Scholars have examined various dynamics of campaign finance's effect on politics; however, despite this increased attention, several important theoretical and empirical questions remain. In this article, we investigate campaign finance, institutional, and economic explanations for post-communist party development. We test the impact of campaign finance restrictions and public fund availability on several measures of party institutionalization. The results of our analysis are important for outlining the role of public financing and restrictions on structuring party development.

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Section: Institutionalization In the Post-communist Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Institutionalization In the Post-communist Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance on Party System Institutionalization

Booth

Robbins

2010

Party Politics

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“…Third, it is not clear that transfers would make a huge difference in SMD elections. Previous analyses of successful SMD candidates indicate that personal resources (incumbency, business ties, experience in regional politics) were key, as was support from regional governors (Golosov, ; Myagkov and Ordeshook, ). In the former case, supplementary resources from the center would likely be marginal at best, even if well targeted.…”

Section: Modeling Strategic Transfersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation

Marques

Nazrullaeva

Yakovlev

2016

Economics & Politics

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Given limited resources and economic realities, how do politicians distribute monetary transfers in order to retain office? Previous work has largely focused on two models – a core model of rewarding loyal supporters and a swing model of purchasing the support of easily swayed voters. Empirical results have proven mixed, however. In this article, we argue that these mixed results are due to economic factors, which condition politicians' distributive strategies. In our model, we consider that politician and voters are involved in a repeated game, where past expectations condition future strategy. Current (core) supporters who receive few benefits and perceive themselves worse off than other, less loyal, groups are likely to be less loyal themselves tomorrow. In our model, politicians avoid this by providing their supporters consumption benefits directly, in the form of transfers, or indirectly, via strong economic growth. Where economic growth is good, politicians can distribute less to core supporters, who benefit from the rising economy. Where economic growth is weak, however, politicians make transfers to their core supporters to ensure future loyalty. We test our theory using data on federal transfers from the Russian Federal government to 78 Russian Regions from 2000–2008.

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“…This seems to be the case in Russia, with its long history of rather competitive elections. Even if not structured along party lines, these elections witnessed vigorous contestation among subnational elites both in national elections (Golosov 2002) and at the regional level (Golosov 2004). In addition, party building under authoritarianism necessarily involves overcoming the commitment problem of sub-national elites, which makes it imperative for them to invest their resources in the dominant party (Reuter and Remington 2008).…”

Section: Theoretically and Empirically Informed Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Party support or personal resources? Factors of success in the plurality portion of the 1999 national legislative elections in Russia

Cited by 24 publications

References 27 publications

Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance on Party System Institutionalization

Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance on Party System Institutionalization

Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation

Growing Old Without Grace: Electoral Authoritarianism and the Age Composition of Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies

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