Given limited resources and economic realities, how do politicians distribute monetary transfers in order to retain office? Previous work has largely focused on two models – a core model of rewarding loyal supporters and a swing model of purchasing the support of easily swayed voters. Empirical results have proven mixed, however. In this article, we argue that these mixed results are due to economic factors, which condition politicians' distributive strategies. In our model, we consider that politician and voters are involved in a repeated game, where past expectations condition future strategy. Current (core) supporters who receive few benefits and perceive themselves worse off than other, less loyal, groups are likely to be less loyal themselves tomorrow. In our model, politicians avoid this by providing their supporters consumption benefits directly, in the form of transfers, or indirectly, via strong economic growth. Where economic growth is good, politicians can distribute less to core supporters, who benefit from the rising economy. Where economic growth is weak, however, politicians make transfers to their core supporters to ensure future loyalty. We test our theory using data on federal transfers from the Russian Federal government to 78 Russian Regions from 2000–2008.
A business enterprise interested in influencing the design, adoption or enforcement of a particular law, rule or regulation often confronts a choice. Does it lobby officials directly? Or does it do so indirectly, using a collective action group as an intermediary? We draw on data from a large, 2010 survey of enterprises across the Russian Federation to demonstrate that the propensity to engage in intermediated lobbying increases with region-level political competition. Our explanation builds on recent evidence confirming Mancur Olson's claim (1982) that less encompassing actors tend to lobby for more distortionary policies. We hypothesize that with greater political competition government officials become more responsive to encompassing voices (i.e. associations of businesses as opposed to single firms), since the electoral costs of being captured by narrower interests becomes greater. Evidence from a complementary survey of regional business association managers points in the same direction; the relative attention paid by officials to lobbying efforts by encompassing associations increases with political competition.
Горячая тема. Круглый стол 198The article reviews background and policy framework for PPP reform and its current development. Descriptive analysis based on 257 firm-college pairs and 1,679 specific collaboration practices between 171 vocational colleges and 257 industry partners show the most common forms of collaboration at provincial level include master instructors assigned by firms, faculty training, stipends and wages for students, and student aid. Moreover, there is a high degree of variation in terms of popularity of each practice among firms. Firm's choice of collaboration model depends on its ownership type. This paper further illustrates how intermediary organizations can facilitate inter-firm collaboration and schoolfirm cooperation under three PPP coordination models, including firm-led, government-led, and jointled model, based on analyses of multiple case studies in various Chinese regions. The paper concludes with a summary of findings and suggestions for future PPP coordination.JEL Classification: D22, I28, I25, J24.Исследователи ловушки среднего дохода отмечают, что главным препятствием для дальнейшего развития стран, достигших среднего уровня доходов, становится замедление роста производительности труда . Такие страны оказываются «неспособны конкурировать в экспорте промышленных товаров со странами с низким уровнем дохода и заработной платы и неспособны конкурировать с передовыми экономиками в инновациях, требующих высокой квалификации…» (Kharas, Kohli, 2011, p. 282). В России разрыв между квалификациями, которые нужны работодателям, и теми навыками, которыми обладают выпускники учебных заведений, представляется весьма глубоким. Этот разрыв может служить объяснением медленного роста экономики в последние годы. Опросы бизнес-сообщества регулярно показывают, что более 60% российских фирм в числе наиболее острых проблем называют нехватку квалифицированных кадров (ОПОРА, 2012; РСПП, 2014). И. Маркес II Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», факультет социальных наук, департамент политической науки, Москва Профессиональное образование и механизмы государственно-частных партнерств в российских регионах 1Аннотация. Исследования по проблемам экономического развития показывают, что рост производительности является важным фактором для перехода в категорию стран с высокими доходами. Профессиональное образование рассматривается как одно из средств достижения данной цели. Однако для этого необходимо соответствие между содержанием образовательных программ и спросом на квалификации со стороны предприятий. Усилия федеральных и региональных властей в России, направленные на поощрение государственно-частного партнерства (ГЧП) между предприятиями и учреждениями профессионального образования, -одно из средств обеспечения такого соответствия. Однако существует много различий между регионами в формах ГЧП и их внедрении. Данная статья описывает современные формы профессионального образования в России, используя оригинальные базы данных по ГЧП в регионах России, и пытается объяснить причин...
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
How does political competition shape the way that firms pursue legislative change? A rich political economy literature describes various ways in which firms influence the design and enforcement of laws, rules and regulations germane to their business activities. Although helpful, this literature is disconnected from work on legislative accountability and political concentration. Making a distinction poorly developed in prior research, we contrast firms that choose to influence policy directly, through un-mediated contacts with executive and legislative branch personnel, and those that do so indirectly, through lobby groups acting as intermediaries. We propose a simple theory that relates the relative costs of lobbying and the strategies firms select to the extent of political competition and concentration. As competition increases and concentration decreases in a region, the use of indirect channels of lobbying becomes more attractive (and vice versa). We test our theory using a survey of 1013 firms across 61 Russian regions. Exploiting substantial variation in political competition and concentration across Russia's regions, we find that firms in politically competitive environments, where there is less concentration, are more likely to use business associations to influence their institutional environment. Using a survey of 315 business associations, we show that these effects may be explained by the variation of the willingness of regional decision-making officials to support more or less encompassing policies depending on local political environment.
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