Partisan Differences in Physical Distancing Predict Infections and Mortality During the Coronavirus Pandemic

Gollwitzer, Anton; Martel, Cameron; Wj, Brady; Ed, Knowles; Jv, Bavel

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3609392

Cited by 29 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, a popular view has gained ground that liberals are in favour of lockdowns to prevent the spread of the virus while conservatives are focused on resuming activities to prevent an economic downturn. This is supported by studies showing an association between conservative political ideology and reduced support for and compliance with pandemic prevention measures, at both the individual [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] and population [10][11][12][13][14][15][16] level. However, such a conclusion appears inconsistent with the well-known link between conservatism and increased threat-sensitivity (including pathogen aversion) 17,18 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to COVID-19

Fischer¹,

Chaudhuri²,

Atkinson³

2020

Preprint

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A popular view, supported by several studies, is that liberals are more concerned than conservatives about COVID-19. This is puzzling given the strong pandemic responses from some conservative nations, and the well-established link between conservatism and threat-sensitivity. We argue a resolution is provided by the dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology, which track trade-offs between: (1) threat-driven group conformity (social conservatism or right-wing authoritarianism [RWA]) vs. individual autonomy (social progressivism); and (2) a competitive motivation for hierarchy (economic conservatism or social dominance orientation [SDO]) vs. cooperation (economic progressivism). Using longitudinal data from a UK sample (n=433), we show that social (RWA), but not economic (SDO), conservatism significantly increased following the pandemic, and self-reported worry about the pandemic predicts this effect. Moreover, both social conservatives and economic progressives display strong responses to COVID-19, but for different reasons. While social conservatives generally display more worried and conformist/norm-enforcing responses, economic progressives display more cooperative, empathic responses and only worried or conformist/norm-enforcing responses related to empathy. These findings provide an explanation for apparently inconsistent results of prior work, support the dual foundations model of political ideology, and offer insight into divergent motives across the ideological landscape that may be useful for managing pandemic response.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to COVID-19

Fischer¹,

Chaudhuri²,

Atkinson³

2020

Preprint

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“…For example, in the United States, Democrats are more concerned than Republicans about the economic consequences of the crisis and the contagiousness and mortality of the virus (20). At the behavioral level, partisanship explains objective metrics of social distancing in the United States better than the actual local incidence of COVID-19 (14,16). Similarly, in Brazil, social distancing considerably decreased after the president publicly dismissed the risks associated with contracting the virus, and this effect was stronger in progovernment localities (33).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The irrational interplay between partisanship, beliefs about the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, and support for policy interventions

Freira¹,

Sartorio²,

Boruchowicz³

et al. 2020

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The COVID-19 pandemic is a global crisis that has forced governments around the world to implement large-scale interventions such as school closures and national lockdowns. Previous research has shown that partisanship plays a major role in explaining public attitudes towards these policies and beliefs about the severity of the crisis. However, the cognitive roots of this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In principle, partisan gaps in policy support could emerge from cost-benefit analyses from individuals with dissimilar perceptions about the severity of the pandemic, as proposed by rational models of partisan behavior. Alternatively, polarized responses may be driven by social identity motives that are unrelated to individual beliefs, as predicted by theories of tribal partisanship. Here, we tested the predictions of these two models across four experiments (N=1980) performed in four different countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and the United States). Participants forecasted the number of COVID-19 deaths in their country after considering either a high or low number. Then, they rated their agreement with a series of interventions. This anchoring procedure, which experimentally induced a large variability in the forecasted number of deaths, did not modify policy preferences. Instead, we observed that partisanship independently modulated the optimism of forecasts and participants’ support for COVID-19 policies. These results, which are against the predictions of the rational partisanship model, have strong policy implications. In particular, our findings suggest that communication strategies aimed at informing the public about the severity of the pandemic will not substantially change levels of support for COVID-19 interventions.

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“…For example, when information emerged about a novel coronavirus in January 2020, there was a lot of uncertainty about the virus and its impact, and people looked to others within their social groups for guidance on how to react. In the US, Democrats and Republicans came to view the threat of the virus very differently as they converged on attitudes and beliefs that were seen to be consistent with the norms of each group (Crimston & Selvanathan, 2020;Gollwitzer et al, 2020;Pew Research Center, 2020), with downstream consequences for engagement in protective actions (Allcott et al, 2020). A similar picture was seen in the UK with groups' divergent sense of trust in science and public health behaviour (Maher, MacCarron, & Quayle, 2020).…”

Section: Social Norms and Social Identitiesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Social norms, social identities and the COVID-19 pandemic: Theory and recommendations

Neville¹,

Templeton²,

Smith³

et al. 2021

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Sustained mass behaviour change is needed to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, but many of the required changes run contrary to existing social norms (e.g., physical closeness with ingroup members). This paper explains how social norms and social identities are critical to explaining and changing public behaviour. Recommendations are presented for how to harness these social processes to maximise adherence to COVID-19 public health guidance. Specifically, we recommend that public health messages clearly define who the target group is, are framed as identity-affirming rather than identity-contradictory, include complementary injunctive and descriptive social norm information, are delivered by ingroup members and that support is provided to enable the public to perform the requested behaviours.

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Partisan Differences in Physical Distancing Predict Infections and Mortality During the Coronavirus Pandemic

Cited by 29 publications

References 0 publications

Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to COVID-19

Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to COVID-19

The irrational interplay between partisanship, beliefs about the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, and support for policy interventions

Social norms, social identities and the COVID-19 pandemic: Theory and recommendations

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