Partisan Cues and Vote Choice in New Multiparty Systems

Abstract

There are numerous studies of the effects of partisan cues in developed democracies, but almost none on how they affect voting in new multiparty systems. This lacuna might stem from untested assumptions that partisan cues are un-influential where parties lack longstanding records as governors, ideological cores, and psychological bonds with citizens. Alternatively, we theorize that even in new multiparty systems, voters use partisan cues to assess candidates' potential performance, resource distribution, democratic credentials, and electoral viability. We test this theory through an experiment in which we varied inclusion of party identifiers on ballots in Uganda, where the multiparty system was only five years old. We find that partisan cues increased selection of major-party candidates over independents, straight-ticket ballots, and votes for copartisans. Our results challenge the common assumption that partisan affiliation is irrelevant to voters in new party systems. Partisan cues can influence political decision-making, even when party-systems are young.

The discerning voter: Party–voter linkages and local distribution under multilevel governance

“…12 The experimental design, thus, captures voters’ (across partisan types) distributive expectations under a plausible, known Congress and BJP sarpanch. This differs from other work that seeks to capture the effect of partisan information shortcuts (Conroy-Krutz et al, 2016).…”

“…Existing research on distributive politics in developing countries suggests that politicians often favour their co-partisan supporters in the allocation of private state benefits and services and local public goods (Bohlken, 2017; Dunning and Nilekani, 2013; Stokes et al, 2013). Models of instrumental voting, thus, focus on the cues that voters use to determine which party will favour people like them, which shapes their vote preferences (Chandra, 2004; Chauchard, 2016; Conroy-Krutz et al, 2016; see Schafner and Streb, 2002; Snyder and Ting, 2002). Following from the view that voters make blunt judgments under limited information, this work broadly expects voters to form consistent distributive expectations vis-à-vis their preferred party across a wide range of state benefits.…”

Electoral reform and partisan dealignment in Indonesia

“…First, we assume that voting can be treated, to a considerable degree, as an expression of partisan identity. While new democracies are often considered to be cases where partisanship is a weak driver of voting behavior, recent research suggests that partisan cues can have a strong effect on voting choices even in least likely scenarios (Conroy-Krutz et al, 2016). With reference to the Indonesian case, Mujani et al show that, indeed, party identity has been a driver of voting behavior in democratic Indonesia, although its relevance in accounting for party choice has been declining steadily from election to election (Mujani et al, 2018: 199).…”

Election Ink and Turnout in a Partial Democracy

“…The ink treatment manipulates knowledge or awareness about the link between ink and the visibility of turnout rather than the practice of inking itself. Informational treatments like the ink prime work one of two ways: they change the factual knowledge base of subjects (a learning effect) or alter the salience of particular considerations (a priming effect) (Conroy-Krutz, Moehler, and Aguilar, 2016). In focus groups prior to the experiment, we found many knew ink would be used in the upcoming election, but not all understood it would make turnout decisions visible for an extended period of time and many had not thought through the political implications of this revelation of information 12 .…”