Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity among Congressional Offices

Abstract

Since the 1990s, members of the US House have shifted resources away from legislative functions to representational activities. We reveal this decline using an original dataset constructed from 236,000 quarterly payroll disbursements by 1,090 member offices for 120,000 unique staff between the 103rd and 113th Congresses, as well as interviews with former members and staff in Congress. These data allow us to test two plausible alternative explanations, one rooted in the centralization of legislative power over time and the other in conservatives’ desires to contract government power. We show that the decline in legislative capacity is symmetrical between and consistent within both parties, contrary to expectations rooted in asymmetrical, ideological sabotage. Additionally, this divestment occurs within incumbent member offices over time, accelerates when new members replace incumbents, and persists when majority control changes. We conclude that competition over institutional control and centralization of legislative functions motivates declining legislative capacity among individual members.

Talking Shops: The Effects of Caucus Discussion on Policy Coalitions

“…Members of Congress rarely attend floor debates, as they spend more time on media appearances and constituency service than on policymaking (Crosson et al. 2020). Committee hearings resemble pitched partisan warfare more than a collaborative search for expertise (Binder et al.…”

“…Unfortunately, contemporary American legislatures do not rise to these same levels of thoughtful, open policy deliberation (Sinclair 1990). Members of Congress rarely attend floor debates, as they spend more time on media appearances and constituency service than on policymaking (Crosson et al 2020). Committee hearings resemble pitched partisan warfare more than a collaborative search for expertise (Binder et al 2016).…”

How Are Politicians Informed? Witnesses and Information Provision in Congress

“…Scholars have raised concerns about Congress’s lack of capacity to address public problems that society faces and fulfill its constitutional role (LaPira, Drutman, and Kosar 2020). Although we focus on the implications of declining congressional capacity at the committee level, Crosson et al (2021) show that individual members of Congress also have reallocated their resources from legislative functions to district activities to increase their electoral chances, a trend that they observe in both parties. Given the multiple changes in congressional capacity both at the committee and members’ office levels, the effect of declining capacity on the acquisition of analytical information needed to produce policy may be even larger than our findings suggest.…”

What Explains a Representative’s Staffing “Style”? Exploring the Relationship between Congressional Staffing Decisions and Electoral Considerations

“…He observes that an increase in legislative staffers is associated with an increase in congressional professionalization. Polsby’s research became a catalyst for a blooming body of works that explores the origins and consequences of congressional staffers (i.e., Crosson et al 2020a; Fenno, 1973; Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019; Kaslovsky, 2021; LaPira & Thomas, 2017; Mayhew, 1974a; McCrain, 2018; Montgomery & Nyhan, 2017; Romzek & Utter, 1997; Salisbury & Shepsle, 1981). For instance, Montgomery and Nyhan (2017) find that a staffer’s policy and institutional expertise can influence a member’s legislative effectiveness and voting record.…”