Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks

Jenkins, Jeffery A.; Crespin, Michael H.; Carson, Jamie L.

doi:10.3162/036298005x201590

Cited by 40 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…These studies demonstrate that progressively ambitious legislators in the US Senate are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never had the desire for higher office (Treul, 2009). Furthermore, the party affects the behavior of its members (Krehbiel, 1993;Cox & McCubbins, 2005;Jenkins et al, 2005). It plays a significant role in legislators' careers in various ways.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…The immediate organization relevant to the legislators is the party, whose importance in parliamentary life has been investigated extensively (Krehbiel, 1993;Cox & McCubbins, 2005;Jenkins, Crespin, & Carson, 2005;Treul, 2009). These studies demonstrate that progressively ambitious legislators in the US Senate are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never had the desire for higher office (Treul, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Akirav¹

2017

IJSSS

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This study attempts to identify the patterns of cooperation between legislators. We argue that if legislators decide to cooperate, they prefer to do so first with their colleagues who share similar affiliations and then across affiliations. In order to examine this hypothesis, we devised a unique cooperation scale and tested it using a sample of the private member bills that were initiated in the 18 th Knesset (Israel's parliament) between 2009 and 2013. We then looked at each bill with regard to its initiators and co-sponsors to see if they were members of the same party, members of the opposition or coalition, or members of a minority group. Based on the quantitative analysis, we found that of all of the factors, only being a minority was significant. Based on the qualitative analysis, we determined that intra-party cooperation does exist. In three parties -Hadash, Meretz and Israel Beitenu --legislators tended to cooperate with each other. Finally, with regard to inter-party cooperation, Jewish and Arab MKs tended to cooperate, and Russian Jewish legislators tended to cooperate regardless of party affiliation. Our study is innovative in its creation of a cooperation scale that can be used in other legislatures and that is based on measures of co-sponsorship instead of analyses of dyadic or social networks used in previous studies.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Akirav¹

2017

IJSSS

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“…Crespin (2010) and Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson (2005) show that members are responsive to party pressure on procedural votes under varying circumstances. In addition, Roberts (2005) finds elevated party pressure on another procedural tool, the motion to recommit.…”

Section: Theories Of Partisan Influence In Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procedural Signaling, Party Loyalty, and Traceability in the U.S. House of Representatives

Carson

Crespin

Madonna

2014

Political Research Quarterly

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In this article, we take advantage of a new source of data providing updates from the Majority Leader's Office that signal the leadership's positions on floor votes. We offer a more nuanced explanation of voting in the U.S. House as our findings suggest that not all procedural votes are created equal. While the most liberal members of the party vote with the leadership on procedural votes at high rates and nearly 100 percent of the time when signaled by the majority leader, moderate members are significantly less likely to support the party and are not responsive to these signals.

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“…We also thank David Fortunato for assistance in preparing the manuscript.1 Among these,Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2002, 2005,Aldrich (1994Aldrich ( , 1995, Rohde (1998, 2001), andRohde (1991) are the most widely cited theoretical and empirical works. Other more recent work includesGailmard and Jenkins (2007),Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson (2005), andLawrence, Maltzman, and Smith (2006).…”

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confidence: 99%

Party Government and the “Cohesive Power of Public Plunder”

Carroll

Kim

2009

American J Political Sci

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We argue that party government in the U.S. House of Representatives rests on two pillars: the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits. Existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the House is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor. In the process, it creates "policy losers" among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes. We posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer. We evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of "roll rates" in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983-96. We find that, within the majority party, policy losers are favored in the distribution of "pork barrel" spending throughout this period.

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Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks

Cited by 40 publications

References 48 publications

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Procedural Signaling, Party Loyalty, and Traceability in the U.S. House of Representatives

Party Government and the “Cohesive Power of Public Plunder”

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