Procedural Signaling, Party Loyalty, and Traceability in the U.S. House of Representatives

Abstract

In this article, we take advantage of a new source of data providing updates from the Majority Leader's Office that signal the leadership's positions on floor votes. We offer a more nuanced explanation of voting in the U.S. House as our findings suggest that not all procedural votes are created equal. While the most liberal members of the party vote with the leadership on procedural votes at high rates and nearly 100 percent of the time when signaled by the majority leader, moderate members are significantly less likely to support the party and are not responsive to these signals.

Minority Opposition and Asymmetric Parties? Senators’ Partisan Rhetoric on Twitter

“…But not all senators are playing the same political game. Some elected officials are partisan warriors, chastising, and attacking partisan opponents (Lee 2009; Theriault 2013), others are party loyalists who champion the party brand in light of constituent or electoral pressures (Aldrich 1995;Carson, Crespin, and Madonna 2014), and some lawmakers avoid the costs of party politics as much as politically feasible (Carson et al 2010). The choices that senators make about the role of party politics in their political brand have implications for electability (Carson et al 2010), negotiation and compromise (Binder and Lee 2015), and political power within the institution (Fenno 1978).…”

Subverting the Organizational Cartel: Explaining Cross-Party Leadership Selection in U.S. State Houses

“…Jeffery Jenkins and Charles Stewart, for instance, argue that the majority party established an organizational cartel in the U.S. House in part "to bend the agenda-setting apparatus of the House in the direction of the majority party's policy aims" (Jenkins & Stewart, 2013, p. 3). Based on that logic, the closer a governing party's members are in agreement ideologically, or the more distant they are from the minority party-or, put another way, the more polarized the legislative parties arethe less incentive there is for any member of the majority to form an alternative organizational cartel with the minority, and the majority party is less susceptible to defections on the vote to maintain its cartel power, just as it is on other kinds of votes (Carson et al, 2014;Jenkins & Stewart, 2013, p. 318). 6 From this follows two alternative, polarization-related hypotheses: that a majority party is more susceptible to violations of its organizational cartel power when it is (a) less unified ideologically or (b) less ideologically distant from the minority.…”

House Republican Decision Making Following the Capitol Riot

“…House Republican division following the attack on the Capitol demonstrates that even within the same party, members of Congress have diverse, overlapping motivations for their behavior (Green 2016; Kingdon 1989). We focus on the following three considerations beyond party loyalty—which, of course, cannot discriminate among members of a single party: First, most members of Congress are responsive to constituent preferences, including district ideology, partisanship, and salient local-issue positions (Arnold 1990; Carson, Crespin, and Madonna 2014). The logic of representative democracy dictates that legislators are sent to Washington to do what their constituents want them to do—and that they can be removed from office if they too often fail to comply. Second, members of Congress must consider strategically how a decision affects their reelection prospects, including from whom a lawmaker gains and loses support in terms of votes and resources (Burke, Kirkland, and Slapin 2020; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Koger and Lebo 2017).…”

“…The logic of representative democracy dictates that legislators are sent to Washington to do what their constituents want them to do—and that they can be removed from office if they too often fail to comply. Second, members of Congress must consider strategically how a decision affects their reelection prospects, including from whom a lawmaker gains and loses support in terms of votes and resources (Burke, Kirkland, and Slapin 2020; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Koger and Lebo 2017). Reelection concerns are particularly important to newly elected members in what Fenno (1978) called the “expansionist phase” of their career and to anyone serving in a highly competitive district with narrow victory margins, regardless of career stage. Third, a Congress member’s ideology guides behavior, with important differences between a party’s ideological moderates and extremists (Carson, Crespin, and Madonna 2014; Kirkland and Slapin 2017; Minozzi and Volden 2013). 1 …”

“…First, most members of Congress are responsive to constituent preferences, including district ideology, partisanship, and salient local-issue positions (Arnold 1990; Carson, Crespin, and Madonna 2014). The logic of representative democracy dictates that legislators are sent to Washington to do what their constituents want them to do—and that they can be removed from office if they too often fail to comply.…”