Partial Adherence to Voluntary Quality Standards for Experience Goods

Winfree, Jason A.

doi:10.1515/jafio-2014-0013

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…This illustrates another cost of a quality standard; it can also be susceptible to fraud or partial compliance. Winfree (2016) gives a theoretical model showing that if not all production is under the ambit of regulation, or there is a certain amount of fraud, then a regional standard can be counterproductive for the firms implementing the standard. In other words, a regional standard must have a certain level of compliance and authenticity to be profitable for the region.…”

Section: Regional Reputationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective reputation and food

Winfree

2022

Applied Eco Perspectives Pol

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This paper gives an overview of the economic literature on food and collective reputation. Often both the quality of food and the producer of the food are not known at the time of purchase; therefore, consumers sometimes rely on a collective reputation for the expected quality. This collective reputation could be for a region, commodity, country, franchise, or cooperative. This paper summarizes the theoretical literature that illustrates incentives for firms and regions, as well as the empirical literature that analyzes collective reputation for various types of food. Recommendations for future work and policy implications are given.

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Section: Regional Reputationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective reputation and food

Winfree

2022

Applied Eco Perspectives Pol

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“…However, in the absence of reliable third-party certification, a consumer's willingness to pay a premium depends on their risk assessment of the entire industry. Think of this as related to industry reputation [40]. If a consumer feels that they face a high risk of unsafe foods, then, regardless of the individual product characteristic (e.g., whether or not the firm invested in traceability), they will not be willing to pay any premium.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The prevailing price will have a premium or not depending on ω relative to Ω. Note that this differs from other analyses in the literature, such as [40] or [39], in that they assume that firms can adopt different levels of quality. In this model, firms adopt the best available traceability technology or they do not.…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

Consumer Welfare of Country-of-Origin Labelling and Traceability Policies

Bruneau

Ugochukwu

2021

Agronomy

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Traceability regulations are a way to protect consumers by forcing firms to identify and track products step-by-step through all stages of production, processing, and distribution. Traceability is often used in conjunction with country-of-origin labelling where products explicitly identify where production takes place. However, such country-of-origin regulations can conflict with WTO provisions. This paper analyzes the impact on consumer welfare of traceability and country-of-origin in an international trading regime to assess whether such regulations actually improve consumer welfare. The paper constructs a theoretical model that highlights the potential market failure that arises from traceability. The paper then introduces a simple international trade regime to identify impacts on consumer surplus. The paper compares outcomes with, and without, traceability and country-of-origin regulations. Given the inherent free-rider problem, the paper shows that, as long as costs associated with traceability are low enough, mandatory regulations are welfare improving. Free trade, in the absence of foreign traceability, can lower consumer welfare so provides a rationale for country-of-origin rules. However, mandatory country-of-origin rules need not be welfare enhancing. We show that country-of-origin rules are similar to import barriers and so are third-best solutions. The better solution is international adoption and recognition of traceability rules which would make country-of-origin rules moot.

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Patented Innovation and Firm Value in the U.S. Food and Drink Industry: The Economic Importance of High-Quality Product Innovation

Grashuis

Dary

2017

Journal of Agricultural &Amp; Food Industrial Organization

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We use patent data to study product, process, and marketing innovation in the food and drink industry. From 1994 to 2005, only 61 of 194 U.S. public food and drink manufacturers patented some type of innovation. Furthermore, we find patent ownership is most common to large corporations, and most patented innovations relate to new designs and processes as opposed to new products. According to our empirical panel analysis, however, stock market investors find patent ownership of new product innovations the most valuable, although the intensity of patent ownership is not of utmost importance. Instead, we conclude patent quality is better able to explain variability in the stock market valuation of U.S. food and drink manufacturers. Specifically, a one-percent increase in the quality of patented innovations in food and drink products facilitates a 0.07 % increase in firm value, corresponding to almost $6 million for the mean innovating firm in the U.S. public food and drink industry.

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Partial Adherence to Voluntary Quality Standards for Experience Goods

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

Collective reputation and food

Collective reputation and food

Consumer Welfare of Country-of-Origin Labelling and Traceability Policies

Patented Innovation and Firm Value in the U.S. Food and Drink Industry: The Economic Importance of High-Quality Product Innovation

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