In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I give is a more general issue about the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in this area.Consider the pre-Socratic debate over whether the world is one or many. While Philolaus says: the world is one, and Heraclitus says: listening not to me but to the account, it is wise to agree that all things are one, Ion of Chios says: all things are three, and there is nothing more or fewer than these three things. Zeno was a bit more ontologically promiscuous, albeit conditionally: if more things than one exist, the things which exist are limitless. For there are always others between the things which exist, and again others between them. And in this way the things which exist are limitless. Melissus disagrees: for if it is limitless it will be one. For if there are two, they cannot be limitless, but will have limits against one another. … there exist just one thing.1 This debate has continued up to our own days.