An Argument for the Ontological Innocence of Mereology

French, Rohan

doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9762-x

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Otherwise σ x.ϕ(x) fails to denote. 19 As for the binary operator +, it is interpreted as . This means that a + b denotes the join of the denotations of a and b.…”

Section: Model Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…25 Concerning the first premise, it is important to note that intuitions about these commitments tend to vary (see, e.g., Boolos [5], Resnik [68], and Landman [31]; for 24 As observed in footnote 23, this conclusion depends on the assumption of a broadly Tarskian framework, which is typically made by both parties to the debate. 25 One way to block the objection would be to claim that mereology is ontologically innocent and hence reject the presupposition that (44) expresses a genuine ontological commitment of (41) [79], and French [19]). If one takes this view, a commitment to sums is no commitment at all.…”

Section: Ontological Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Allowing for this generalization is one reason to distinguish the pluralization operator * and the distributive operator D . The former applies to the translation of noun phrases, the latter to the translation of verb phrases 19. Note that, on this interpretation, the summation operation σ does not correspond exactly to the join operation , since it adds the extra condition that the join be in the denotation of ϕ(x).…”

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Plurals and Mereology

Florio

Nicolas

2020

J Philos Logic

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In linguistics, the dominant approach to the semantics of plurals appeals to mereology. However, this approach has received strong criticisms from philosophical logicians who subscribe to an alternative framework based on plural logic. In the first part of the article, we offer a precise characterization of the mereological approach and the semantic background in which the debate can be meaningfully reconstructed. In the second part, we deal with the criticisms and assess their logical, linguistic, and philosophical significance. We identify four main objections and show how each can be addressed. Finally, we compare the strengths and shortcomings of the mereological approach and plural logic. Our conclusion is that the former remains a viable and well-motivated framework for the analysis of plurals.

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“…Otherwise σ x.ϕ(x) fails to denote. 19 As for the binary operator +, it is interpreted as . This means that a + b denotes the join of the denotations of a and b.…”

Section: Model Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ontological Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Plurals and Mereology

Florio

Nicolas

2020

J Philos Logic

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“…One conclusion to draw is that mereology is actually ontologically innocent and that we were wrong in thinking that the ontological commitments of the mereologist were greater than that of the nihilist. (Moves in this direction have been made: French () argues for the innocence of mereology using flexible predicates and infinitary logic instead of plural predicates and plural logic. Cotnoir () does not argue for the innocence of mereology, but does give a set‐theoretical semantics in which a composite may be said to be identical with its parts such that composites are no additional ontological commitments.)…”

Section: Going Beyond Quine?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The logic behind Quine's criterion of ontological commitment

Smid

2020

European J of Philosophy

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This article first explains why Quine took first-order classical logic to be the only language in which we should formulate a theory or declarative statement to determine its ontological commitments. I then argue that Quineans cannot relax Quine's restriction to classical logic such that any nonclassical logic may be used to uncover a theory's ontological commitments. The reason is that this leads to radical ontological relativism according to which the ontological commitments of a theory are relative to a logic. This is not a Quinean picture of ontology, but a Carnapian one. Finally, I consider whether Quineans can go beyond Quine by allowing for classical and plural logic, but no other logics. I claim that this is not possible because plural logic is not transparent: it allows for ontologically nonequivalent theories to be formulated such that they come out as ontologically equivalent. 1 | INTRODUCTION Meta-ontology is the study of ontology. The claim that existence is univocal is thus a meta-ontological claim. As is the claim that to determine what exists, we have to consult our best sciences. The meta-ontological framework that currently dominates the analytic tradition of philosophy is due to Quine. It is summarized by Varzi (2014a, p. 47) in three credos: • Credo 1: There is only one notion of existence, adequately captured by the existential quantifier. • Credo 2: Being and existence are the same. • Credo 3: We are ontologically committed to all and only those entities that must exist in order for the theories or statements we hold to be true to be true.

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“…More conservative OSR-proponents deny this, arguing that relational structure is ontologically "more fundamental" than individual, physical objects (French 2014;Ladyman 2007: 24). The most radical parsimony fetishists among OSR-proponents advance an outright eliminativist view about physical objects: "all that there is," they claim, "is structure" (da Costa & S. French 2003: 189, emphasis added; cf.…”

Section: 21: a Defense Of The Typologymentioning

confidence: 99%

A metaphilosophy of naturalism

Childers¹

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Fales. I also thank my students for not only helping me sharpen my pedagogy but also for the many lessons that they have given me. Additionally, I am grateful to my colleagues and friends throughout my education, all of whom have been stimulating, worthy interlocutors and gadflies.Finally, for her resolute, steadfast devotion and support-emotional, intellectual, moral, and more-I am extraordinarily thankful to my partner, confidant, and best friend, Hanna G. Childers.

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An Argument for the Ontological Innocence of Mereology

Cited by 3 publications

References 21 publications

Plurals and Mereology

Plurals and Mereology

The logic behind Quine's criterion of ontological commitment

A metaphilosophy of naturalism

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