Partenariat et sous-traitance : une approche par la théorie des incitations

Abstract

[eng] The aim of the article is to interpret the recent evolution of coordination mechanisms governing subcontracting relations, particularly extension of the duration of the agreement between the two contracting parties. Using tools of analysis based on the theory of incentives, the author considers partnerships as the building of an « incentive System ». Two aspects of incentive are studied from this point of view : on the one hand, the contract, and on the other hand, the incentive to innovate. However, partnership does not alter the relationship of authority which is inherent in this type of inter-firm agreement. [fre] L'article a pour objectif d'interpréter l'évolution récente des mécanismes de coordination de la relation de sous-traitance, et notamment l'allongement de la durée d'engagement entre les contractants. En utilisant les outils d'analyse de la théorie des incitations, l'auteur envisage le partenariat comme la mise en place d'une « structure incitative ». Dans cette optique, deux procédures incitatives sont étudiées : le contrat d'une part, l'incitation à l'innovation d'autre part. Pourtant, le partenariat ne remet pas en cause la relation d'autorité inhérente à ce mode de rapports inter-firmes.

The Governance of Networks and Economic Power: The Nature and Impact of Subcontracting Relationships

“…Similar thoughts can be found in the theoretical literature of the 70s and in some works of the 80s, where authors were concerned with the relation of intrinsic dependence of the subcontractor with respect to the prime firm. In line with this view, the 'authority-mode relationship' was at the basis of the interpretation of subcontracting relationships and it implied professional subordination and economic dependence of the subcontractor, conferring to quasi-vertical organisations a strong hierarchical character (Baudry, 1993).…”

“…This suggests some new tendencies, for example: longer arrangements; a division of labour conceived on the basis of the increased importance of technical contributions provided by the 'partner firm'; and the development of just-in-time delivery processes. Differently from authors who have seen the transition from traditional subcontracting (characterised by conflicting relations) to cooperative partnership (Jarillo, 1988), there are others who maintain that new partnerships are far from contesting the authoritarian relationship between prime firm and subcontractor (Baudry, 1993).…”

“…Traditionally, the structure of dependence was explained in terms of the length of the relation and on the basis of the professional subordination of subcontractors. More recent studies (Baudry, 1993) point to the core firm's power to renew contracts and decide over the structure of incentives, or to the power to decide over prices. Similarly, as Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) emphasised, dependence (of the subcontractor or, oppositely, of the prime-contractor) could be related to actors' opportunity to choose whether to renew a contractual relation.…”

Commerce extérieur et disparitions d’entreprises industrielles

“…Si les choix faits pouvaient être optimaux pour tous les types de firmes, les combinaisons de facteurs qui en découleraient limiteraient considérablement les cessations d'entreprises : la corrélation entre l'efficacité des allocations productives et les cessations pures d'entreprises serait alors négative. Mais si les grandes entreprises choisissaient par exemple de privilégier leurs positions sur les marchés extérieurs, elles établiraient avec les firmes de type // des relations de production limitées à la sous-traitance de spécialité (Chaillou, 1977;Baudry, 1993). C'est en clair une sous-traitance confiée à des entreprises n'appartenant pas pour l'essentiel à la même industrie, qui serait positivement corrélée avec les cessations pures d'entreprises dans le secteur d'origine des donneurs d'ordres, le taux de couverture ayant alors une influence paradoxalement favorable sur les cessations pures.…”

The ambivalence of the inherent nature and purpose of humanitarian organisations: a research theme for the management sciences*

“…The sole purpose of this management fiction is to emphasise the fact that, by organising themselves and stepping up their demands, donors could have greater impact on the action of NGOs than appears to be the case at present. It is therefore possible to propose an interpretation of the donor/NGO relationship in terms drawn from the economic theory of contracts, and more precisely from the principal/agent relationship (a mandatetype relationship characterised by (1) asymmetry of information between the giver (principal) and the receiver (agent) of the mandate and (2) a conflict of interest between the two parties: see Baudry 1993). …”