Parliamentary control over the use of armed forces against terrorism – in defence of the separation of powers

Paulus, Andreas; Vashakmadze, Mindia

doi:10.1017/s0167676807001134

Cited by 2 publications

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“…Considering these characteristics in light of earlier work linking crisis management to executive dominance (e.g. Curtin 2014;Paulus and Vashakmadze 2007;Topaloff 2012), the pandemic can be viewed as a 'crucial case study' (Gerring 2007: 231), i.e. a case central to the examination of democracies' tendencies -in emergencies -to curtail parliaments' formal role to enhance executive autonomy.…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Starting with the indicators central to conduct with-in country comparisons over the course of a crisis, we assess whether governments could choose between different pre-existing legislative foundations for their crisis response, and, if so, to which extent the foundation chosen reduced (or maintained) parliamentary policy-making power as compared to available legislative alternatives. As in emergency situations the legal foundation(s) for (relatively autonomous) executive action are regularly altered, usually broadened (Curtin 2014;Ferejohn and Pasquino 2004;Paulus and Vashakmadze 2007;Topaloff 2012), we also considered whether and how emergency legislation was reformed and how this affected parliamentary policy-making power. If such reforms took place, we considered three aspects: first, whether new legislation delimits parliamentary policy-making power more than existing legal foundations to manage the crisis, second, whether new emergency provisions significantly expand the substantive regulatory scope for 'exceptional' executive action outside the normal law-making process, and third, whether legal changes put in place are restricted to the current COVID-19 crisis or not (Table 2, upper half).…”

Section: Data Period Of Examination and Indicators To Assess Parliamentary Policy-making Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Parliaments in times of crisis: COVID-19, populism and executive dominance

Bolleyer

2021

West European Politics

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This article assesses the extent to which European governments' legal strategies (i.e. the choices of and changes in the legal foundation(s) authorising executive action) to address the COVID-19 pandemic enhanced executive autonomy to the detriment of parliamentary policy-making power, defined as the formal ability of parliaments to constrain executive rule making. Approaching the reduction in parliamentary policy-making power as one indication of 'executive aggrandisement', it contrasts the prominent claim in the literature that populist governments tend to use emergencies to weaken formal checks on executive power with a hypothesis derived from research on crisis policy making, associating such tendencies with unified executives lacking internal checks and balances. Assessing six European governments' legal strategies between January 2020 until the present (spring 2021), the formal weakening of parliaments' role in law making was -overall -more pronounced among 'unified executives' than governments including major populist parties, pointing to a source of 'democratic vulnerability' in emergency situations transcending Central Eastern Europe.

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Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data Period Of Examination and Indicators To Assess Parliamentary Policy-making Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Parliaments in times of crisis: COVID-19, populism and executive dominance

Bolleyer

2021

West European Politics

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Parliamentary Consent to the Use of German Armed Forces Abroad: The 2008 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in theAWACS/Turkey Case

Aust¹,

Vashakmadze²

2008

Ger. law j.

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Since the German Federal Constitutional Court's 1994 decision on the deployment of AWACS surveillance aircraft over the Adriatic Sea, it is one of the cornerstones of German constitutional law that Parliament (theBundestag) needs to consent to the external use of German Armed Forces in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is likely. However, theBundestagmay neither determine “the modalities, the dimension and the duration of the operations, nor the necessary coordination within and with the organs of international organizations.” As the requirement of constitutive parliamentary approval is not directly set out in the German Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court (in the following: FCC or the Court) derived it from the general constitutional framework. The concept of “parliamentary army”, designed by the Court, attempts to strike a balance between executive effectiveness and parliamentary participation.

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Parliamentary control over the use of armed forces against terrorism – in defence of the separation of powers

Cited by 2 publications

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Parliaments in times of crisis: COVID-19, populism and executive dominance

Parliaments in times of crisis: COVID-19, populism and executive dominance

Parliamentary Consent to the Use of German Armed Forces Abroad: The 2008 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in theAWACS/Turkey Case

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