PAM: A Fair and Truthful Mechanism for 5G Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

Chouayakh, Ayman; Bechler, Aurélien; Amigo, Isabel; Nuaymi, Loutfi; Maillé, Patrick

doi:10.1109/pimrc.2018.8580859

Cited by 9 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The first auction mechanism which was proposed in the LSA context is named LSAA [11]; we have shown that this mechanism is not incentive compatible, and proposed PAM [12], a truthful auction mechanism that outperforms LSAA in terms of revenue and fairness. However, PAM relies on the assumption that players will accept even an infinitesimal portion of the LSA bandwidth.…”

Section: Contributions Of the Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While the group formation has a non-negligible impact on the auction's outcome, in this paper (as in [11], [12], [25], [26] that also rely on groups) we assume that the groups are formed by the auctioneer, and advertised to bidders, before any bids are submitted. We indeed focus here on how to allocate the resource among groups, based on the submitted bids.…”

Section: Grouping Operators Before the Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This can extremely harm the efficiency and the revenue. For LSAA, we have shown in [12] that this mechanism is not always truthful, we therefore adapt it in two different fashions in the next subsection.…”

Section: Lsaamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [12] we proposed PAM, which allocates to each group k a fraction α k of the bandwidth in proportion to the bids submitted by players belonging to that group i.e.,…”

Section: Proportional Allocation Mechanism (Pam)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We denote by n i the number of groups which i belongs to. The initial version of PAM in [12] was ac-tually designed under this assumption. The payment rule is given by:…”

Section: • Vcg*mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Licensed shared access for 5G: Which auction mechanism to choose?

et al. 2020

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Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a complementary solution allowing Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to use another incumbent's frequency spectrum after obtaining a proper license from the regulator.Using auctions to allocate those LSA-type licenses is a natural approach toward an efficient use of spectrum, by controlling the incentives for MNOs to declare their true valuation for the spectrum and allocating it to those who value it the most. A specificity of LSA licenses lies in the interactions among buyers, due to possibly overlapping coverage areas, this allows for allocating the same spectrum to several MNOs.In this paper, we review the existing mechanisms taking into account such radio interference constraints, propose new ones, and compare their performance. We show how to increase the revenue, while maintaining truthful-telling, of all-or-nothing auction mechanisms by introducing a reserve price per bidder. We also investigate extensions of those mechanisms, namely when the management of interference among base stations is more subtle than partitioning base stations into groups of non-interfering base stations. For each mechanism, we show how to optimize a trade-off between expected fairness, expected revenue and expected efficiency by carefully working with groups and reserve prices. Simulations suggests that the extension of those mechanisms may lead to increase an indicator combining allocation fairness, social welfare and seller's revenue by more than 20%.

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Section: Contributions Of the Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Grouping Operators Before the Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Lsaamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [12] we proposed PAM, which allocates to each group k a fraction α k of the bandwidth in proportion to the bids submitted by players belonging to that group i.e.,…”

Section: Proportional Allocation Mechanism (Pam)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We denote by n i the number of groups which i belongs to. The initial version of PAM in [12] was ac-tually designed under this assumption. The payment rule is given by:…”

Section: • Vcg*mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Licensed shared access for 5G: Which auction mechanism to choose?

et al. 2020

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A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Allocation of LSA Spectrum Blocks for 5G

Chouayakh

Bechler

Amigo³

et al. 2019

Static &Amp; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &Amp; Applications

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HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

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An Ascending Implementation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for the Licensed Shared Access

Chouayakh

Bechler

Amigo

et al. 2021

Network Games, Control and Optimization

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Licensed shared access is a new sharing concept that allows Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to share the 2.3-2.4 GHz bandwidth with its owner. This sharing can be done after obtaining a license from the regulator. The allocation is made among groups such that two base stations in the same group can use the same spectrum simultaneously. In this context, different auction schemes were proposed, however they are all one-shot auctions. In this paper, we propose an ascending implementation of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) when the regulator has K identical blocks of spectrum to allocate. The implementation is based on the clinching auction. Ascending auctions are more transparent than one-shot auctions because bidders see the evolution of the auction. In addition, ascending auctions preserve privacy because bidders do not reveal necessarily their valuations.

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PAM: A Fair and Truthful Mechanism for 5G Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

Cited by 9 publications

References 7 publications

Licensed shared access for 5G: Which auction mechanism to choose?

Licensed shared access for 5G: Which auction mechanism to choose?

A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Allocation of LSA Spectrum Blocks for 5G

An Ascending Implementation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for the Licensed Shared Access

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