An Ascending Implementation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for the Licensed Shared Access

Abstract

Licensed shared access is a new sharing concept that allows Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to share the 2.3-2.4 GHz bandwidth with its owner. This sharing can be done after obtaining a license from the regulator. The allocation is made among groups such that two base stations in the same group can use the same spectrum simultaneously. In this context, different auction schemes were proposed, however they are all one-shot auctions. In this paper, we propose an ascending implementation of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) when the regulator has K identical blocks of spectrum to allocate. The implementation is based on the clinching auction. Ascending auctions are more transparent than one-shot auctions because bidders see the evolution of the auction. In addition, ascending auctions preserve privacy because bidders do not reveal necessarily their valuations.

Dynamic Fairness-Aware Spectrum Auction for Enhanced Licensed Shared Access in 6G Networks

“…Objective Function Optimization Algorithm Auction Auction Mechanism Auction Fairness Spectrum Sensing [8] Maximizing spectrum efficiency Blockchain-based x x x x x x x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [9] Maximizing spectrum efficiency Heuristic x x x x x x x x x x x x [10] Maximizing allocated spectrum Heuristic x x x x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ x x x [11] Minimizing interference Correlation algorithm x x x x x x x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [12] Maximizing spectrum efficiency Monte-carlo x x x x x x x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [13] Maximizing operational power Alternating direction optimization (ADO) x x x x x x x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [14] Maximizing operational power Numerical simulation x x x x x x x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [15] Maximizing social welfare (income and fairness) Greedy ✓ ✓ ✓ VCG mechanism ✓ ✓ ✓ x x x [16] Maximizing allocated spectrum Greedy ✓ ✓ ✓ Sealed-bid double auction x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [17] Maximizing allocated resources (spectrum and antennas) Greedy ✓ ✓ ✓ Clock auction x x x x x x [18] Minimizing costs Greedy ✓ ✓ ✓ Sequential auction x x x ✓ ✓ ✓ [19] Maximizing revenue Greedy ✓ ✓ ✓ Heuristic (flex auction) x x x x x x [20] Maximizing the total utility of the system Greedy ✓ ✓ ✓ Preallocation-based combinatorial auction ✓ ✓ ✓ x x x Our Work…”

“…The study proposes an auction-based LSA framework that enables VNOs to share spectrum and infrastructure, including antennas, using technologies like massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and virtualization to enhance the framework while ensuring quality of service (QoS) for all users. Paper [17] explores LSA, allowing MNOs to share bandwidth in the 2.3 − 2.4 GHz spectrum range with the incumbent. The authors propose an ascending auction mechanism based on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction to allocate spectrum among base station groups, ensuring fairness and truthfulness.…”