Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past–Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

Abstract

It seems self‐evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will, too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is in the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but they prefer their pleasure to lie in the past and do not predict that others' levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past–future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible.

Toward an Account of Intuitive Time

“…What advantages might there be to understanding the discrepancies between the ways in which people naively think about time and our scientific understanding of time? One possibility is that this knowledge could potentially help devise strategies to help people to avoid temporal biases, such as valuing events more when they are located in the future rather than the past (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso et al., 2013; Hoerl et al., 2022), and preferring unpleasant experiences to be located in the past and pleasant experiences in the future (Lee et al., 2020; Parfit, 1984; Sullivan, 2018). Some philosophers have argued that such time biases are irrational and could lead to decisions that ultimately hamper people's well‐being (e.g., Dougherty, 2015; Greene & Sullivan, 2015; Sullivan, 2018).…”

“…Do people also hold an intuitive theory of time ? Although there is a large body of psychological research on, for example, the way people represent time spatially (e.g., Bender & Beller, 2014; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Tillman et al., 2018), on attitudes toward time (e.g., Caruso et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2021; Lee et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2022; Mello et al., 2013), and on how time is encoded in language (e.g., Boroditsky, 2011; Evans, 2013), there are only the beginnings of empirical research on intuitive beliefs about time. Moreover, what there is by way of research on this issue does not tell us whether people's intuitive beliefs about time can be said to form a theory, and, if they do, whether there is consistency across individuals as regards the elements of that theory.…”

Is Discounting for Tense Rational?

“…Yesterday's surgery, if it happened, lasted for X hours; tomorrow's, if it happens, will last for Y hours. When asked, some people prefer to find out that they already had the surgery, even if X >> Y (see Lee et al 2020). Can EDU model this kind of preference?…”

Bias towards the future

“…A second possible explanation appeals to autobiographical memory. Lee et al (2020) leave open the possibility that the individuals described in the vignette remember the relevant events, while in the vignettes from Greene et al (2021b;forthcoming), the individual is said to temporarily fail to remember whether the event occurred. Since the recollection of a memory can itself be a positive or negative hedonic event, the presence of such memories could play a role in mitigating apparently future-biased preferences.…”