Oxford Utilitarianism Scale

Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A. C.; Earp, Brian D.; Caviola, Lucius; Faber, Nadira S.; Crockett, Molly J.; Savulescu, Julian

doi:10.1037/t66969-000

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Their choices and moral judgments showed that they adapted their decision-making approach towards CBR when it led to better outcomes than following moral rules, and towards moral rules when CBR led to worse outcomes. This learning appears to involve generalization, as it affected people's willingness to break other rules and their endorsement of utilitarianism, which is usually considered a stable personality trait (Kahane et al, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognitive Learning from Consequences of Past Choices Shapes Moral Decision-Making

Maier¹,

Cheung²,

Bartoš³

et al. 2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many controversies arise from differences in how people resolve moral dilemmas by following deontological moral rules versus consequentialist cost-benefit reasoning (CBR). This article explores whether and, if so, how these seemingly intractable differences may arise from experience and whether they can be overcome through moral learning. We designed a new experimental paradigm to investigate moral learning from consequences of previous decisions. Our participants (N=387) faced a series of realistic moral dilemmas between two conflicting choices: one prescribed by a moral rule and the other favored by CBR. Critically, we let them observe the consequences of each of their decisions before making the next one. In one condition, CBR-based decisions consistently led to good outcomes, whereas rule-based decisions consistently led to bad outcomes. In the other condition, this contingency was reversed. We observed systematic, experience-dependent changes in people's moral rightness ratings and moral decisions over the course of just 13 decisions. Without being aware of it, participants adjusted how much moral weight they gave to CBR versus moral rules according to which approach produced better consequences in their respective experimental condition. These learning effects transferred to their subsequent responses to the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, indicating genuine moral learning rather than task-specific effects.Our findings demonstrate the existence of rapid adaptive moral learning from the consequences of previous decisions. Individual differences in morality may thus be more malleable than previously thought.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognitive Learning from Consequences of Past Choices Shapes Moral Decision-Making

Maier¹,

Cheung²,

Bartoš³

et al. 2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…versus deontic criteria (following a set of rules), with psychologists uncovering a number of moderating factors, including emotion, moral character, and egoism (Greene et al, 2001;Kahane et al, 2015Kahane et al, , 2018Shenhav & Greene, 2010;Siegel, Crockett, & Dolan, 2017). Because utilitarian and deontic criteria often reach similar conclusions, this debate has been difficult to adjudicate.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimality bias in moral judgment

Freitas

Johnson

2018

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The second major measure chosen to evaluate discriminant validity was the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS), designed to account for intuitions regarding fair division under a utilitarian ethic of fairness or equality. The OUS consists of independent dimensions of Impartial Beneficence and Instrumental Harm (23).…”

Section: Validation Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, research on consequentialist reasoning (23) has articulated two well-validated scales assessing a specific notions of fairness-as-impartiality in terms of two independent motives underlying utilitarian consequentialist decision making: impartial beneficence and instrumental harm (23). Given the availability of these measures, we wished, therefore, to test association of mutualism to impartial beneficence.…”

Section: Validation Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free to choose: Mutualist Motives for Partner Choice, Proportional Division, Punishment, and Help

Lin¹,

Bates²

2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mutualism – the disposition to cooperate in ways that benefit both actor and recipient – has been proposed as a key construct in the evolution of cooperation, with distinct adaptations for 1) partner choice, 2) division, 3) punishment, and 4) helping. However, no psychological measure or validation of this psychological structure exists. To fill this need, in two pre-registered studies (total N = 902), we: (A) Develop and administer items assessing each of the four mutualist adaptations; (B) Show good fit to the predicted four factor model; (C) Demonstrate reliability and stability across time; (D) Evidence discriminant validity from existing constructs, including compassion and utilitarianism; (E) Establish external validity by predicting proportional choices in catch division, opposition to partner coercion, and reduced support for redistribution; and (F) Replicate each of these findings. Jointly, these results support the validity of mutualism, including a motive to maintain the freedom to choose, and provide reliable scales for use in integrating, further developing, and applying mutualism.

show abstract

Oxford Utilitarianism Scale

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Metacognitive Learning from Consequences of Past Choices Shapes Moral Decision-Making

Metacognitive Learning from Consequences of Past Choices Shapes Moral Decision-Making

Optimality bias in moral judgment

Free to choose: Mutualist Motives for Partner Choice, Proportional Division, Punishment, and Help

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About