Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms

Abstract

International audienceThis paper investigates the impact of family control on French acquirers' performance.We consider a sample of 239 acquisitions undertaken by French listed companies between January 1997 and December 2006. Comparing both, short-termand long-termperformance,we find that family-controlled firms outperformnon-family firms. We find that the relationship depends on the control level. The higher operating performance of family firms is statistically significant for an intermediate level of control. Around the announcement date, family firms with a high level of control outperform non-family firms. Using the calendar time approach, we find that long-term stock performance of family firms is positive and statistically significant. Robustness tests showthat our findings seem to not be driven by the endogeneity problem. Finally, we find that family wedge, due to the use of the pyramidal structure and the double voting rules, has no statistical significant effect

Corporate ownership and market valuation in South Africa: uncovering the effects of shareholdings by different groups of corporate insiders and outsiders

“…Previous studies examining the association between director shareholdings and firm valuation have relied primarily on agency theory in interpreting their empirical results (Mork et al, 1988;Bouzgarrou and Navatte, 2013;Knyazeva et al, 2013;Zhou et al, 2013). In this section, we 2 See Larcker and Rusticus (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of the different types of endogeneity problems that are prevalent within the positive empirical accounting literature, as well as ways by which they could be addressed.…”

“…In line with the mixed theoretical literature, the empirical evidence on the association between corporate officer (insider and outsider) ownership, and market valuation is conflicting (Morck et al, 1988;Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998;Himmelberg et al, 1999;Davies et al, 2005;Bouzgarrou and Navatte, 2013). Specifically, a group of studies finds that ownership by corporate insiders and outsiders impacts positively on market valuation (Welch, 2003;Krivogorsky, 2006;Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007;Connelly et al, 2012).…”

“…With specific reference to incentives and shareholdings by corporate officers (insiders and outsiders), the King Reports seek to encourage corporate officers in particular to hold shares of companies that they run in order to closely align their interests with those of shareholders (King Committee, 1994, 2002. More specifically, the King Reports suggest that the performance-related elements of the compensation packages of corporate officers (especially directors), such as vested shares and options should form a large part of the total compensation (King Committee, 2002;West, 2006West, , 2009 (Morck et al, 1988;McConnell and Servaes, 1990;Davies et al, 2005;Bouzgarrou and Navatte, 2013;Knyazeva et al, 2013;Zhou et al, 2013). Our contribution lies in using a much richer dataset that allows us to further analyse the valuation implications of shareholdings of a larger group of different corporate officers (insiders and outsiders).…”

Influência da estrutura de propriedade e do gerenciamento familiar sobre o posicionamento em fusões e aquisições

“…Portanto, em casos como esses, quando a participação acionária detida pela família controladora não for grande o suficiente para assegurar a persistência do controle em posse da família, após uma operação de fusão, por exemplo, dificilmente esta operação ocorrerá (Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011;Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013 Depreende-se a partir da revisão da literatura apresentada, que a empresa familiar é uma fonte de orgulho e de renda da família, o patrimônio da empresa familiar geralmente é formado ao longo de anos, famílias têm expectativa de transferir a empresa para gerações futuras, especialmente se a companhia for da família durante várias gerações. Assim, as famí-lias não abrirão mão do controle tão facilmente, e caso se envolvam em fusões ou aquisições, assumirão uma posição ativa, ou seja, como adquirentes.…”

“…Bouzgarrou & Navatte (2013) consideram as famílias como investidores com visão de longo prazo e que mantém posições sustentáveis em suas empresas, logo, tendem a ser avessas ao risco oriundo de fusões e aquisições. Todavia, ao se envolverem nesse tipo de operação, como um meio de expansão dos negócios, pode significar que tais empresas esperam que o negócio seja rentável o suficiente para compensar o risco (Shim & Okamuro, 2011 (2010), contribui para um posicionamento como adquirente, mas, por outro lado, a possibilidade de endividamento pode influenciar para que a operação não se concretize.…”