Ownership and Voting Power in France

Bloch, Laurence; Kremp, Élisabeth

doi:10.1093/0199257531.003.0004

Cited by 37 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Table 2 provides insights into the ownership structures and the distribution of power among large shareholders. First of all and consistent with numerous previous studies (Bloch and Kremp, 2001;Faccio and Lang, 2002), France appears as a concentrated ownership country. Only 9.4% of the observations are widely held firms (i.e.…”

Section: Dependent and Control Variablessupporting

confidence: 91%

“…8 Here, this lack of accuracy does not stem from mistakes in the commercial databases (as mentioned by Dlugosz et al, 2006) but from the fact that French specificities of governance and ownership are not well taken into account. 9 About this mechanism, see also Bloch and Kremp (2001) and Ginglinger and Saddour (2006). 10 Results are available upon request.…”

Section: Footnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value: Evidence from French Listed Firms

Belot

2008

SSRN Journal

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In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure of the shareholder agreements' clauses. In line with previous literature, a negative relationship between firm value and the dispersion of voting rights across major shareholders is observed. However, the existence of a shareholder agreement tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is more pronounced when a "concerted action" provision is in force and/or the contracting shareholders are of the same type. Shareholder agreements thus appear as efficient coordination mechanisms rather than expropriation mechanisms. AbstractIn listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure of the shareholder agreements' clauses. In line with previous literature, a negative relationship between firm value and the dispersion of voting rights across major shareholders is observed. However, the existence of a shareholder agreement tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is more pronounced when a "concerted action" provision is in force and/or the contracting shareholders are of the same type. Shareholder agreements thus appear as efficient coordination mechanisms rather than expropriation mechanisms.

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Section: Dependent and Control Variablessupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Footnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value: Evidence from French Listed Firms

Belot

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…3 An extensive body of evidence has in fact confirmed that industry outcomes are affected by the financial status of market participants. 4 Building on this idea, a few recent theoretical papers have investigated whether internal capital markets established within business groups and multi-segment firms, by providing a source of financial slack to member units, may turn them into stronger competitors. 5 However, due to the lack of reliable data on corporate group structures, little work has empirically investigated whether and how access to internal capital markets affects a firm's competitive conduct.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets

Boutin

Cestone

Fumagalli

et al. 2013

Journal of Financial Economics

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We provide evidence suggesting that incumbents' access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper presents three major findings. First, the amount of cash holdings owned by incumbent-affiliated groups is negatively related to entry in a market. Second, the impact on entry of group deep pockets is more important in markets where access to external funding is likely to be more difficult. Third, the "entry deterring effect" of group deep pockets is more pronounced when groups have more active internal capital markets. Our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and that they have a potential anti-competitive effect.

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“…Becht and Röell (1999) provide a summary of the main findings of this network. For individual country studies see Becht and Böhmer (1999), , Bianchi et al (1999), Bloch and Kremp (1999), Crespí-Cladera and Garcia-Cestona (1999), De Jong et al (1999), Goergen and Renneborg (1999) and Gugler et al (1999).…”

Section: Ownership Structure and Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Köhler

2009

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08110.pdf Non-Technical SummaryOwnership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe. Das Wichtigste in Kürze Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector Matthias Köhler Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)December 2008 Abstract:Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe.

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Ownership and Voting Power in France

Cited by 37 publications

References 2 publications

Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value: Evidence from French Listed Firms

Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value: Evidence from French Listed Firms

The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

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